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POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
THE UNDERENFORCEMENT PROBLEM: 
THE CASE OF THE NATIONAL 
HEALTHCARE LAW 
ERNEST A. YOUNG* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Contemporary constitutional theory draws an important conceptual 
distinction between the Constitution itself and the doctrinal rules that the courts 
employ to enforce it.1 Constitutional doctrine implements constitutional 
principles—often by developing doctrinal “tests” that help courts determine 
when some other actor has acted in a constitutionally impermissible way. The 
“tiers of scrutiny” that dominate modern equal protection doctrine,2 for 
example, do not appear in the text of the Fourteenth Amendment; rather, they 
are judicial constructs that help courts implement the Amendment’s 
requirements in particular circumstances. Courts fashioning such doctrine must 
pay attention not only to the meaning of the underlying constitutional principle, 
but also to various institutional factors, including inherent institutional 
constraints on judicial decisionmaking that stem from the nature of judicial 
legitimacy, the institutional capacities of courts, and the relationship between 
courts and other actors. 
The distinction between principle and doctrine often gives rise to a gap 
between meaning and enforcement.3 Sometimes this results in overenforcement: 
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 1. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001); Akhil Reed 
Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term—Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 26, 26–28 (2000). 
 2. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439–42 (1985). 
 3. See H. Jefferson Powell, Reasoning About the Irrational: The Roberts Court and the Future of 
Constitutional Law, 86 WASH. L. REV. 217, 234 (2011) (“There is . . . a gap between what the direct 
command of the Constitution literally requires . . . and what the Court deems appropriate or even 
essential in the enforcement of those requirements. It is the existence of this gap between constitutional 
command and judicial rule, in a sense, that defines constitutional doctrine.”); Ernest A. Young, Making 
Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1733, 1741–48 (2005). 
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For prophylactic reasons, courts may enforce a constitutional principle more 
broadly than its strict meaning requires. The overbreadth doctrine in First 
Amendment law, for instance, allows courts to strike down laws even though 
the challenger’s speech is unprotected, simply because the law might also be 
applied to protected speech.4 The effect is to allow the constitutional 
prohibition to sweep more broadly than its conceptual scope—to protect, 
functionally speaking, unprotected as well as protected speech.5 More often, 
courts underenforce constitutional norms: As Larry Sager has explained in a 
pathbreaking article, sometimes “the Court, because of institutional concerns, 
has failed to enforce a provision of the Constitution to its full conceptual 
boundaries.”6 Courts do this for institutional reasons rather than for analytical 
ones; hence, when a constitutional norm is underenforced, its doctrinal 
application simply does not exhaust the conceptual meaning of the underlying 
constitutional principle.7 
For a variety of reasons, the judge-made doctrine that enforces 
constitutional limits on national authority tends to underenforce those limits—
sometimes radically so. That underenforcement problem is at center stage in the 
debate about the national healthcare law. In that debate, the “smart money” is 
confident that the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)8 is 
constitutional—that it is, in fact, an easy case. Laurence Tribe, who practically 
defines the “smart money” in constitutional law, has said that “this law’s 
constitutionality is open and shut.”9 Similarly, Erwin Chemerinsky’s 
contribution to this conference insists that “the federal healthcare law is 
constitutional. It is not even a close question.”10 
 
 4. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1593 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Because 
an overly broad law may deter constitutionally protected speech, the overbreadth doctrine allows a 
party to whom the law may constitutionally be applied to challenge the statute on the ground that it 
violates the First Amendment rights of others.”). 
 5. One may also think of warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), in this 
way. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985) (“The Miranda exclusionary rule . . . serves 
the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself. It may be triggered 
even in the absence of a Fifth Amendment violation.”). 
 6. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 
91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213 (1978); see also Powell, supra note 3, at 242–45.  
 7. Courts are not the only institutions that create a gap between the meaning of the Constitution 
and their enforcement of it. For instance, the War Powers Resolution purports to be an interpretation 
by Congress of the allocation of war powers between Congress and the President. But that statute 
arguably both overenforces some limits on the President’s authority (for example, by applying to 
Presidential actions that do not amount to an act of war) and underenforces others (by allowing the 
President to initiate hostilities and continue them for sixty days without congressional approval). 
Presumably these gaps have their origins in certain institutional limitations of the Congress in dealing 
with crises that give rise to military action. 
 8. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 
42 U.S.C.). 
 9. Laurence Tribe, On Health Care, Justice Will Prevail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2011, at A27. Much 
of the present author’s knowledge of constitutional law, such as it is, consists in what he learned from 
Professor Tribe in law school. 
 10. Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Ideology and Constitutional Decision-Making: The Coming 
Example of the Affordable Care Act, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2012 at 3.  
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These assessments, and others like them,11 rest not so much on what the 
Constitution means conceptually but rather on what the Supreme Court has 
said about it—particularly since 1937. That, of course, is the date of the Court’s 
famous “switch in time,” in which the Court acquiesced in the development of 
the national welfare state by signaling that it would no longer vigorously 
enforce principles of economic liberty or limits on national power.12 Dean 
Chemerinsky, for example, is careful to acknowledge that the ACA’s 
constitutionality is easy “under existing doctrines.”13 He is probably correct: 
Current doctrine gives contemporary lawyers good reason to be confident that 
the Court will uphold the ACA because that doctrine is extremely deferential 
to Congress. Federalism is, in other words, underenforced in current law, and if 
that underenforcement continues, there is every reason to expect the ACA to 
survive current challenges to its constitutionality. 
What I want to resist in this essay, however, is any supposition that the 
current underenforcement of federalism or economic liberty is somehow 
natural, inevitable, or necessarily correct. To see why, consider the state of 
constitutional law circa, say, 1920. At that time, Supreme Court doctrine 
enforced both federalism-based limitations on national authority and due 
process protections for freedom of contract much more aggressively than it does 
today.14 At the same time, it is fair to say that extant doctrine underenforced the 
Equal Protection Clause’s principle of racial equality,15 the Establishment 
Clause’s prohibition on public sponsorship of religious messages,16 and the First 
Amendment’s protection for speech critical of the government.17 Today, of 
course, it would practically be unthinkable to defer to government action that 
trenched on these constitutional principles—but it would have been virtually 
 
 11. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers: The Obvious Constitutionality of 
Health Care Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/ 
04/26/koppelman.html; Peter J. Smith, Federalism, Lochner, and the Individual Mandate, 91 B.U. L. 
REV. 1723 (2011).  
 12. See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392–400 (1937) (upholding state 
minimum wage legislation against a freedom of contract challenge); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 34–46 (1937) (upholding provisions of the National Labor Relations Act against a 
Commerce Clause challenge); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. 
L. REV. 1231, 1232 (1994) (“The post-New Deal conception of the national government has not 
changed one iota, nor even been a serious subject of discussion, since the Revolution of 1937.”). 
 13. Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at 3. 
 14. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down a New York law limiting the 
hours of bakers on freedom of contract grounds); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (striking 
down a Louisiana law regulating insurance on freedom of contract grounds); United States v. E.C. 
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (limiting Congress’s Commerce Clause authority to matters that directly 
affected buying and selling across state lines). 
 15. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding a law providing for “separate but equal” 
accommodations for white and black persons on trains). 
 16. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), did not strike down the New York Regent’s Prayer until 
1962. 
 17. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (upholding Schenck’s conviction under 
the Espionage Act of 1917 for criticizing the military draft, notwithstanding his First Amendment 
challenge). 
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unthinkable in 1920 to defer to the government on basic questions of federalism 
and economic liberty. My point, of course, is that which constitutional principles 
get underenforced changes over time. 
The interesting question is why and how these changes occur. I argue here 
that such changes have a lot to do with the notion of “thinkability” mentioned 
in the last paragraph; in other words, the Court’s perception of which 
institutional constraints warrant underenforcement of which constitutional 
principles has a lot to do with what is going on in the broader society. One 
obvious change between 1920 and today is that the public has come to accept 
and even expect an extensive role for government generally—and the national 
government in particular—in regulating the economy. Part of the story thus 
consists in the commonplace observation that changes in public attitudes about 
government tend to result in changes in constitutional doctrine.18 
There is a second aspect to the story, however. That aspect focuses on public 
perceptions of the status and role of the courts—particularly the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Public opinion evolves not only with respect to matters of policy—for 
example, the appropriate level of government regulation and social provision—
but also with respect to the role of judicial review itself. Because doctrinal 
underenforcement consists in the courts’ willingness to defer constitutional 
judgments to other actors, broad trends in public opinion influence not only the 
weight that the courts give to other political institutions but also the confidence 
with which the courts approach their own tasks. Although the Supreme Court 
started out in a precarious institutional position with uncertain popular 
legitimacy, over time it has solidified its role and achieved an impressive level of 
“diffuse support”—that is, support that does not depend on public agreement 
with the merits of particular decisions.19 To the extent that judicial review seems 
accepted, respected, even desired, we can expect the Court to defer less to 
Congress, the President, or state institutions on particular issues. 
These observations shed some light, I hope, on the extent to which we can 
expect the current underenforcement of federalism-based limitations on 
national power (and perhaps even of economic liberties under the Due Process 
Clause) to change. Broad trends in public opinion—including but not limited to 
the Tea Party movement in current politics—have questioned the national 
regulatory state. At the same time, state governments, which were once 
identified with ineffectual efforts to ameliorate the Depression and the 
oppression of African Americans, now enjoy a resurgence in public confidence. 
And the Court itself has recovered its self-confidence and prestige since the 
nadir of court-packing and now enjoys a reputation not only as the primary 
 
 18. See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS 
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 5–12 (2009) 
(documenting the shift during the New Deal period in public expectations of government); id. at 14 
(concluding that “over time, as Americans have the opportunity to think through constitutional issues, 
Supreme Court decisions tend to converge with the considered judgment of the American people”). 
 19. See id. at 12–16. 
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guardian of our liberties but as an important arbiter of government structure as 
well. It is not inconceivable—although perhaps not yet likely—that the 
confluence of these tendencies will cause the Court to reconsider the 
underenforcement of federalism. 
Part II of this essay examines the constitutional case against the ACA, as 
well as the extent to which the weakness of that case may be attributed to the 
underenforcement of the relevant constitutional principles. Part III then 
considers the theory of doctrinal underenforcement and its historical 
contingency. Finally, Part IV examines the relationship between 
underenforcement and popular constitutionalism in the debate over the 
national healthcare law. 
II 
UNDERENFORCED CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS IN THE NATIONAL 
HEALTHCARE DEBATE 
If the ACA survives constitutional challenge, it will not be because the law 
is clearly consistent with constitutional norms.20 The Act’s expansion of federal 
regulatory authority, its imposition of regulatory obligations upon state 
governments, and its intrusion on individual freedom of choice are all 
unprecedented, if not in principle then in scope or magnitude, in our history. In 
other eras—not just the Founding, but the early parts of the last century as 
well—those features would most likely have been seen as flatly inconsistent 
with the constitutional role of government in general and the limited role of the 
national government in particular. This is not to say that the ACA is clearly 
unconstitutional either, but rather to say that the conceptual meaning of the 
relevant constitutional concepts is contested, and in fact has been so for much 
of our history. And what makes challenging the ACA an admittedly uphill 
battle today is that current constitutional doctrine underenforces all of the 
relevant concepts. 
Legal controversy has centered primarily (although not exclusively) on the 
Act’s “individual mandate,” which requires virtually every American to 
purchase and maintain a minimum level of health insurance coverage.21 It is not 
altogether clear whether this is because the individual mandate is the Act’s 
most constitutionally vulnerable provision (it may not be), or because it is the 
provision most readily understood by non-health law experts and its intrusion 
on individual choice resonates most broadly with the body politic. As I will 
discuss later on, the lawsuits challenging the Act should be understood not 
simply as litigation seeking to achieve a particular legal result but also as 
 
 20. Cf. Randy Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance Mandate 
is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 581, 583 (2010) (“There are three ways to analyze 
whether a law is constitutional or not. Does it conflict with what the Constitution says? Does it conflict 
with what the Supreme Court has said? Are there five votes for a particular result? Unless we are clear 
about which sense of ‘unconstitutional’ we are using, we are likely to talk past each other.”).  
 21. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(1) (West 2011). 
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vehicles for articulating a particular—and perhaps divergent—conception of 
constitutional meaning. In any event, I will focus here on the individual 
mandate although I will have a bit to say about the Act’s conditional spending 
provisions as well. 
A. The Commerce Clause 
The Commerce Clause restricts Congress’s regulatory authority to 
“commerce . . . among the several states.”22 In Gibbons v. Ogden, John Marshall 
insisted that “[t]he enumeration [of federal powers] presupposes something not 
enumerated,”23 and the Tenth Amendment makes this clear by providing that 
every power not granted to the national government is “reserved” to the States. 
Article I thus restricts Congress’s authority along two dimensions: many 
activities do not involve “commerce,”24 and not all commerce is “among the 
several states.”25 And in fact for the greater part of our history, constitutional 
doctrine distinguished sharply between “commerce” and other activities that do 
not involve buying and selling, such as “agriculture” or “manufacturing,”26 and 
between interstate and intrastate commerce.27 This model of federalism, which 
relied on the Court to define and police separate and exclusive spheres of state 
and national authority, was generally known as “dual federalism.”28 
The courts, however, found these distinctions much more indeterminate in 
practice than they might appear in theory. Economically speaking, activities like 
manufacturing or consumption of goods are closely tied to the buying and 
selling of them, and local markets had become closely integrated with national 
and international ones by at least the early twentieth century. As the size and 
responsibilities of the national government expanded in response to the 
Depression, the Court found itself under increasing pressure to recognize these 
realities. Although disagreement persists as to whether the Court ultimately 
changed course because of these conceptual difficulties or as the result of more 
overt political pressure in the form of FDR’s “court-packing” plan,29 what is 
 
 22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 23. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824).  
 24. See id. at 204–06 (distinguishing Congress’s power over commerce from the reserved power to 
enact quarantine and health laws). 
 25. See id. at 195 (“The completely internal commerce of a State . . . may be considered as reserved 
for the State itself.”). 
 26. United States v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) (“Commerce succeeds to manufacture, and 
is not a part of it.”). 
 27. See id. at 15–16 (distinguishing between “direct” and “indirect” effects on interstate 
commerce). 
 28. See, e.g., ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, The Role of the Court, in FEDERALISM: INFINITE 
VARIETY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 8, 24–25 (Valerie A. Earle ed., 1968); see also ANTHONY J. 
BELLIA, JR., FEDERALISM 183 (2011) (“The dual federalism paradigm understands federal and state 
governments to operate in different spheres of authority.”). 
 29. Compare, e.g., ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 175 (1960) 
(ascribing the switch in the Court’s stance to a combination of FDR’s sweeping 1936 electoral victory, 
the outbreak of a new wave of labor disputes, and the court-packing plan), with BARRY CUSHMAN, 
RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 6 
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clear is that the Court ultimately abandoned this “dual federalism” regime.30 
The modern doctrine abandons both of the potential limiting principles 
noted above.31 It eschews any effort to confine “commerce” to buying and 
selling, notwithstanding strong evidence that this was the original understanding 
of the term at the Founding. Rather, commerce now includes all “economic 
activity.”32 Similarly, the modern cases assume the complete integration of the 
national market, having abandoned any distinction between “inter-” and “intra-
“state economic activity. Congress may reach any economic activity that has a 
“substantial effect” on the national economy, and the criterion is evaluated by 
considering the aggregate effect of all similar activity.33 Moreover, Congress’s 
judgment on that question is subject only to rational basis review.34 The result is 
not only an easy standard to meet, but deference to Congress as to whether it 
has been met. 
This generous standard is not all. In the rare instances in which a regulated 
activity is not “commercial” or “economic” in nature, Congress may 
nonetheless regulate if the regulation is “necessary and proper” to a broader 
scheme of commercial regulation. Hence, in Gonzales v. Raich, Justice Scalia 
said that even if consumption of homegrown marijuana for medicinal purposes 
did not amount to commercial activity, Congress could still regulate it because 
failure to do so would make Congress’s broader effort to regulate the 
recreational marijuana market more difficult to enforce.35 Necessity, moreover, 
has traditionally been evaluated under the deferential standard of McCulloch v. 
Maryland: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the 
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to 
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution, are constitutional.”36 Again, the doctrine entails a broad 
 
(1988) (arguing that the conventional account overlooks the critical role of doctrinal developments, 
internal to the law, that made the pre-1937 jurisprudence unsustainable). 
 30. See Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 17 (1950) (observing 
that, by 1950, the “entire system of constitutional interpretation” embodied in dual federalism lay “in 
ruins”). 
 31. For a survey of alternate federalism models that remain viable after the demise of dual 
federalism, see Ernest A. Young, The Puzzling Persistence of Dual Federalism, in NOMOS (James 
Fleming & Jacob Levy eds.) (forthcoming 2012).  
 32. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (“[T]hus far in our Nation’s history our 
cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where 
that activity is economic in nature.”). 
 33. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125–29 (1942). 
 34. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995). 
 35. 545 U.S. 1, 34–42 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 36. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). The Court did suggest some willingness to tweak the 
McCulloch standard in its most recent “necessary and proper” case, United States v. Comstock, 130 S. 
Ct. 1949 (2010). That case upheld the federal civil commitment statute for mentally ill, sexually 
dangerous federal prisoners as necessary and proper to the enforcement of federal criminal laws 
enacted pursuant to Congress’s various enumerated powers. The majority’s careful consideration of the 
commitment provision’s “necessity,” however, was hardly the rubber stamp that we have come to 
expect under McCulloch. Moreover, Justice Kennedy—who might as well have a “5” tattooed on his 
forehead in federalism cases—wrote separately to insist that the McCulloch standard should not be 
YOUNG (DO NOT DELETE) 4/3/2012 11:39 AM 
164 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 75:157 
substantive rule, augmented by judicial deference to the political branches on 
the question whether the rule has been satisfied.37 
It is hard to see how the plaintiffs can successfully challenge the ACA—or 
any other federal statute—under these rules. In United States v. Lopez38 and 
United States v. Morrison,39 the Rehnquist Court struck down two federal 
statutes on the ground that they exceeded Congress’s commerce power. But in 
each case, it was plausible to say that if those statutes fell within Congress’s 
commerce authority, no conceivable statute would fall outside it. The Court was 
unwilling, in other words, to read the Commerce Clause out of the Constitution 
entirely. But the Court has generally been reluctant to go further and strike 
important federal statutes so long as any conceivable limiting principle would 
remain.40 
It is not clear that the ACA has this “last straw” quality that seems to have 
been so essential in Lopez and Morrison. For one thing, proponents of the 
ACA can always point to the Gun Free School Zones Act and the Violence 
Against Women Act as federal laws that would remain unconstitutional even if 
the ACA is upheld.41 But it should also be clear that the contemporary doctrine 
underenforces the underlying constitutional principles at every turn. The Court 
defers to the political branches on whether activity is “commerce,” whether it 
takes place “among the several states,” and—in the rare case where these 
capacious definitions cannot be met—whether noncommercial regulation is 
nonetheless “necessary and proper.” The reasons for this deference have to do 
not only with the indeterminacy of the underlying distinctions, but also with the 
Court’s historical experience. The Court’s failure to defer on these questions, 
after all, is precisely what brought about the painful confrontation with the 
political branches in the 1930s.42 The result, however, is that very little scope 
 
equated with the very lenient form of “rational basis” review applied in privacy cases not involving 
fundamental rights. See id. at 1966–68 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 1970 
(Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Although the term ‘necessary’ does not mean ‘absolutely 
necessary’ or indispensable, the term requires an ‘appropriate’ link between a power conferred by the 
Constitution and the law enacted by Congress. . . . And it is an obligation of this Court to enforce 
compliance with that limitation.”) (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 415). 
 37. Although I have criticized aspects of this doctrine elsewhere, see, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Just 
Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the Federalist Revival after Gonzales v Raich, 2005 SUP. CT. 
REV. 1, 21–37, I have generally praised the notion that the national and state governments exercise a 
largely concurrent jurisdiction, see Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the 
Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139 (2001). The point is simply that current 
doctrine limits national power far less strictly than dual federalism did. 
 38. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 39. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 40. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding the Controlled Substances Act even 
as applied to medicinal use of homegrown marijuana). 
 41. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Neil Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of 
Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 135 (2010) (suggesting that Lopez and Morrison were rightly 
decided but that the ACA is more defensible than the statutes struck down in those cases). 
 42. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 604 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The modern respect for the 
competence and primacy of Congress in matters affecting commerce developed only after one of this 
Court’s most chastening experiences, when it perforce repudiated an earlier and untenably expansive 
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remains for judicial enforcement of the underlying constitutional norms. 
B. The Individual Rights Claim 
At its heart, the constitutional objection to the individual mandate sounds in 
individual liberty. Senator John Kyl of Arizona, for example, describes the 
mandate as “a stunning assault on liberty.”43 Randy Barnett—the most 
prominent legal academic critic of the individual mandate—describes the 
ultimate problem with the provision as “commandeering the people.”44 “Unless 
they voluntarily choose to engage in activity that is within Congress’s power to 
regulate or prohibit,” he explains, “the American people retain their sovereign 
power to refrain from entering into contracts with private parties.”45 
A less lawyerly version of the argument lies behind the famous “broccoli 
question”: “If Congress can order you to buy health insurance, why can’t it 
order you to buy (and eat!) broccoli?”46 The implication is surely not that 
making you eat broccoli would be OK as long as a state does it. Similarly, one 
suspects that the visceral reaction to being forced to purchase health insurance 
would be similar even if the mandate came from a state legislature rather than 
Congress.47 The objection must therefore rest on an individual right secured 
 
conception of judicial review in derogation of congressional commerce power.”). 
 43. Jeffrey Young, Kyl: Health bill a ‘stunning assault on liberty’, THE HILL, Sept. 22, 2009, 
http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/59761-kyl-health-bill-a-stunning-assault-on-liberty-. 
 44. Barnett, supra note 20, at 581. 
 45. Id. at 634. This point comes at the end of a lengthy and thoughtful exegesis of more traditional 
arguments under the Commerce and Taxing powers, but I think it is fair to say that this individually 
based argument best captures the intuitive heart of Professor Barnett’s objection to the mandate. See 
id. at 587–620.  
 46. Daniel Fisher, Obamacare Judges Must Answer The “Broccoli Question”, FORBES, Nov. 18, 
2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2011/11/18/obamacare-judges-must-answer-the-broccoli-
question/. Your humble author was once nearly thrown out of a Federalist Society gathering for 
allowing that Commerce Clause doctrine might not prevent Congress from ordering all Americans to 
eat broccoli, suggesting instead that any constitutional challenge to such a law would better rely on 
substantive due process, and admitting that current doctrine might not support that challenge either. 
For a similar conclusion, from someone that no one would dare throw out of a Federalist Society 
gathering, see The Constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act: Hearing Before the S. Com. on the 
Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Charles Fried, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School). 
 47. Consider, for example, a legislative proposal in South Dakota to mandate that individuals 
purchase a firearm. The proposal is meant to dramatize the illegitimacy of forcing individuals to 
purchase health insurance, and the proponents appear to see no critical difference in the fact that this 
proposal comes from a state government, not from Congress. See South Dakota Lawmakers Propose 
Mandating Gun Ownership—To Make Point About Health Law, FOX NEWS (Feb. 1, 2011), 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/02/01/sd-lawmakers-propose-mandating-gun-ownership-make-
point-health-law/. 
  Not everyone shares this view, however. For example, one of the leading articulations of Tea 
Party objections to the individual mandate distinguishes sharply between the ACA’s mandate and 
governmental mandates requiring individuals to buy auto insurance: 
But is mandatory car insurance really analogous to mandatory health insurance under 
Obamacare? No, for this simple reason: the sovereign mandating car insurance is the state, not 
federal, government. And . . . the principle of limited government is a principle that applies to 
the federal government, not the state. 
ELIZABETH PRICE FOLEY, THE TEA PARTY: THREE PRINCIPLES, 37 (2012). Professor Foley goes on 
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against all governments.48 
This ultimate grounding in individual rights explains the somewhat peculiar 
character of the Commerce Clause arguments in these challenges, which focus 
on a distinction between action and inaction.49 While it is true that no previous 
case upholding federal legislation under the Commerce Clause has involved 
inaction, as opposed to action, it is also true that none of those opinions actually 
focused on the distinction. When Congress regulates action, however, it almost 
always leaves the individual the option to avoid participating in the federal 
obligation simply by refraining from engaging in the activity; a law requiring 
affirmative conduct thus feels like more of an imposition—however much we 
may pooh-pooh any action–inaction distinction as “formalistic.”50 This intuition 
comes through fairly clearly in the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion striking down the 
ACA under the Commerce Clause. The gist of the opinion is that if the ACA is 
constitutional, then there is no meaningful limit on Congress’s power, but the 
apparent reason that the ACA has this “last straw” quality is not so much the 
noneconomic nature of health insurance, but rather the fact that the ACA 
requires individuals to participate in an economic transaction against their will.51 
The obvious constitutional home for this sort of objection is the old doctrine 
of “freedom of contract”—or, more precisely, freedom not to contract. In Meyer 
v. Nebraska, for example, the Court said that “liberty” in the Due Process 
Clause involves 
 
to locate auto insurance mandates within the general police power, which she sees as one of the 
“numerous and indefinite” powers that Madison held to be reserved to the states. See id. From this 
point of view, there would be no obvious objection to state laws that required individuals to purchase 
health insurance, acquire firearms, or—heaven forbid—eat broccoli. 
 48. For an acknowledgement by one of the ACA’s defenders that at some point government 
interference with individual health choices would run afoul of individual rights, see Michael Dorf, The 
Federalism Objection to the Individual Mandate, DORF ON LAW (Nov. 3, 2009), 
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2009/11/federalism-objection-to-individual.html (recognizing that a 
“requirement to see a doctor would come close, in my view, to violating the common law right—
assumed to be a constitutional right in the Cruzan case—to refuse medical treatment,” and that “an 
order to exercise does appear to go too far”). The important point for my purposes is that these 
examples differ from the individual mandate in degree, but not in kind. 
 49. See, e.g., Brief for Private Respondents at 32–33, Department of Health and Human Services v. 
State of Florida et. al. (No. 11-398) (U.S. Feb. 6, 2012); see also FOLEY, supra note 47 at 47–50; Barnett, 
supra note 20, at 604–05. 
 50. See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, Free Riding on Benevolence: Collective Action Federalism and the 
Individual Mandate, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2012, at 43 (criticizing the distinction between 
inactivity and activity as “formal” and “arbitrary”); cf. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 212 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (decrying “attempts to draw a sharp and 
rigid line between action and inaction” as “formalistic reasoning [that] has no place in the 
interpretation of the broad and stirring Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment”); THE BHAGAVAD 
GITA AS IT IS, CHAPTER 4, TEXT 18, http://www.asitis.com/4/18.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2011) (“One 
who sees inaction in action, and action in inaction, is intelligent among men.”). 
 51. Compare, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (holding that gender-
motivated violence is not a commercial activity and therefore not regulable under the Commerce 
Clause), with Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1292–93 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(“Although any decision not to purchase a good or service entails commercial consequences, this does 
not warrant the facile conclusion that Congress may therefore regulate these decisions pursuant to 
the Commerce Clause.”). 
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not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to 
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful 
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God 
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges 
long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free 
men.
52
 
The right to make one’s own choices about how to guard against sickness and 
injury fits comfortably within this rubric. 
Except, of course, that this doctrine is dead, dead, dead. The best cite for a 
doctrine of freedom not to contract would be Lochner v. New York,53 and while 
Lochner still has its defenders,54 the Justices of the United States Supreme 
Court are not among them. The Court has generally not actually disavowed the 
notion that the Constitution protects economic liberty, and the federal courts 
remain open to hear claims that those liberties have been infringed.55 Meyer 
itself, moreover, is still good law, although it is generally now misread as having 
enforced a purely personal right.56 Even the traditional “double standard” 
between economic and personal rights may well be breaking down.57 But for 
now, current doctrine still reviews most economic liberty claims under a 
standard so deferential as to negate any hope of a successful challenge. Once 
again, contemporary doctrine at once affirms that a constitutional principle of 
economic liberty exists in the Constitution but defers to political actors the 
question whether that principle has been violated in any particular case. 
Freedom of contract, in other words, is so underenforced that the challengers of 
the ACA largely refrain from explicitly invoking it.58 
C. The Spending Clause 
The final avenue of challenge, which I consider only briefly in this essay, 
concerns the extensive provisions of the ACA that require implementation by 
state governments. States must establish “healthcare exchanges,” for example, 
 
 52. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
 53. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down a New York law regulating the hours of bakers on the ground 
that it unreasonably restricted the bakers’ freedom to contract). 
 54. See, e.g., DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL 
RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM (2011). 
 55. See, e.g., Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998) (debating whether economic substantive 
due process barred retroactive imposition of liability on employers for healthcare benefits to former 
employees). 
 56. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 77 (2000) (relying on Meyer, but for the narrow 
proposition that the Due Process Clause protects “a parent’s interests in the nurture, upbringing, 
companionship, care, and custody of children”). As the quotation accompanying note 52, supra, 
indicates, Meyer located these interests within a much broader freedom of self-determination that 
included economic matters like choosing an occupation and making contracts. 
 57. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (applying strict scrutiny under the 
First Amendment to strike down an economic regulation of the sale of medical information in the 
healthcare industry). 
 58. The challenges in the Florida litigation, for example, did not appeal the district court’s dismissal 
of their substantive due process claim. See Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1292 n.93 (11th Cir. 2011). 
YOUNG (DO NOT DELETE) 4/3/2012 11:39 AM 
168 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 75:157 
that meet a variety of federal requirements, and they must also implement a 
significantly expanded version of Medicaid.59 The Act does not, however, simply 
mandate that States participate in this way; any such requirement would run 
afoul of the anti-commandeering doctrine, which holds that Congress may not 
require state legislatures or executive officials to implement a federal program.60 
Rather, it conditions significant grants of federal funds on the States’ 
compliance with the ACA’s requirements. 
As the Court has made clear, the Spending Clause limits Congress’s power 
to impose such requirements. If it did not, then the national government could 
use its vast resources and ability to preempt the states’ revenue base to end-run 
virtually any constitutional protection for state sovereignty.61 Contemporary 
doctrine thus holds that conditions on the states’ receipt of federal funds must 
(1) promote the general welfare, (2) be clearly stated, (3) be “germane” to the 
purpose of the underlying federal funding, (4) not require the recipient to take 
action that would be unconstitutional for it to take, and (5) leave the states an 
actual choice as to whether or not to accept the funds—that is, not be coercive.62 
The Spending Clause challenge to the ACA relies primarily on this fifth and last 
prong of the Dole test—that is, it argues that the amounts of money at stake are 
so large that the states have no real alternative to participating in the national 
program.63 
The problem, of course, is that this constraint is also an underenforced 
constitutional norm. The Supreme Court has found a federally-imposed 
condition unconstitutionally coercive exactly once: The federal Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 invited state governments 
to legislate in various ways to provide for disposal of radioactive wastes; if they 
did not, the ultimate sanction was that a State would have to “take title” to the 
wastes generated within its borders, thereby incurring any liability for the 
impacts of unsafe disposal.64 The Court determined that the choice whether to 
legislate according to federal requirements or “take title” to all the radioactive 
waste was not a real choice at all; the condition, in other words, was coercive 
and therefore had to be treated as an outright requirement (which was 
 
 59. See, e.g., FOLEY, supra note 47, at 70 (“The Florida Obamacare lawsuits assert that many 
provisions of health reform commandeer state officials. For example, states are required to collect data 
on the average risk of health insurance policies and assess a penalty (or reward) when insurers exceed 
(or undercut) the average.”). Related arguments emphasize the spending obligations imposed by the 
Act. See id. (“[States] also argue that, because expanding Medicaid eligibility to 133 percent of the 
federal poverty level dramatically increases costs of running a Medicaid program, states are effectively 
forced to devote billions more dollars at a time when state budgets are stretched to capacity.”). 
 60. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 
178 (1992). 
 61. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Spending after Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911 (1995). 
 62. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987). 
 63. See, e.g., Amended Complaint, State of Florida, et al., v. U.S. Department of Health & Human 
Services, at 27 (May 14, 2010). 
 64. New York, 505 U.S. at 153–54. 
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unconstitutional because it “commandeered” the state legislature).65 But the 
“take title” provision invalidated in New York is so unusual as to virtually prove 
the rule that more conventional spending conditions are unlikely to be found 
coercive. Even the Eleventh Circuit, which struck down the individual mandate, 
upheld the ACA’s requirements on the states against the plaintiffs’ Spending 
Clause challenge.66 As Elizabeth Foley has acknowledged, “[c]oercion claims 
aren’t getting any traction for the simple reason that the Supreme Court in Dole 
provided no guidance about how to know when federal strings cross the line 
from encouragement to coercion.”67 In the absence of a determinate standard, 
courts have chosen simply to back off. 
D. Federalism and Economic Liberty 
Before analyzing the underenforcement problem in more depth, I want to 
take a moment to discuss how the arguments just canvassed interact. Several of 
the ACA’s defenders have noted that the heart of the constitutional objection 
to the individual mandate—and in particular its intuitive appeal to many 
laypeople—rests on conceptions of individual economic liberty, rather than 
federalism. Those defenders seem to think that this fact presents a major 
problem for the ACA’s critics. As Peter Smith puts it, “if the problem with the 
individual mandate is that it violates a libertarian ideal, then federalism is an 
inappropriate constitutional framework in which to consider it.”68 
This objection overlooks something fundamental about the role of 
federalism in our constitutional system. As Ann Althouse has noted, 
“federalism . . . can protect constitutional rights better than the direct assertion 
of claims based on those rights.”69 It is easy to identify examples in which 
federalism-based limits have been asserted—sometimes successfully, sometimes 
not—for the purpose of protecting conceptions of individual liberty that would 
have been difficult to vindicate directly. Professor Althouse focuses on two 
instances involving the anti-commandeering doctrine. In Printz v. United States70 
itself, that doctrine absolved local law enforcement of the obligation to enforce 
federal gun control laws, thereby effectively protecting the right to bear arms 
well before District of Columbia v. Heller71 made it respectable to assert Second 
Amendment claims directly. Likewise, several state and local governments 
forbade their officials to cooperate in the enforcement of the USA PATRIOT 
Act72 because those governments believed various aspects of the Act to violate 
 
 65. See id. at 174–77 (discussing this provision). 
 66. See Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1262–68 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 67. FOLEY, supra note 47, at 73–74. 
 68. Smith, supra note 11, at 1726. 
 69. Ann Althouse, The Vigor of Anti-Commandeering Doctrine in Times of Terror, 69 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1231, 1274 (2004). 
 70. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 71. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 72. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
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individual rights against unreasonable searches and seizures as well as 
antidiscrimination norms. Although such arguments faced dubious prospects if 
asserted in an actual legal challenge to the Act, the anti-commandeering 
doctrine gave functional shelter to those claims by preventing Congress from 
requiring state and local officials to implement the Act.73 
The Commerce Clause can operate in similar fashion. In Gonzales v. 
Raich,74 for example, terminal cancer patients asserted not only that Congress 
lacked authority to regulate medicinal use of homegrown marijuana, but also 
that they had an individual constitutional right—sounding in privacy under the 
Due Process Clause—to alleviate their suffering by using the drugs of their 
choice.75 Had Raich gone the other way, it would have shielded this aspect of 
personal autonomy from federal intrusion; as it was, however, the Raich 
plaintiffs had to assert their Due Process rights directly on remand, whereupon 
the Ninth Circuit rejected that claim.76 Likewise, at least one lower federal court 
has struck down national efforts to discourage same-sex marriage on 
enumerated powers grounds,77 and concerns about the limits of Congress’s 
commerce power may well have given pause to opponents of same-sex marriage 
who might otherwise have sought to legislate an outright national ban. 
Professor Smith’s objection, shared by many of the mandate’s defenders, 
rests on a quite different conception of constitutional federalism. On this view, 
federalism has certain purposes—for example, to facilitate decentralized 
regulation on matters implicating unique local conditions—and federalism 
doctrine should generally be a direct function of those underlying purposes.78 
Professor Siegel’s contribution to this symposium, for example, brings to bear 
his important recent work with Robert Cooter arguing that the Constitution 
confers power on Congress to act wherever national action is necessary to solve 
a collective action problem among the states.79 Smith thus argues that it is 
“intellectually incoherent” to use federalism arguments to protect individual 
liberties that may have little to do with these structural purposes of federalism.80 
There are three serious problems with this argument. The first is that, as I 
have already discussed, it ignores federalism’s role in protecting individual 
liberty even when the liberty in question is not a fundamental right that would 
forbid governmental regulation in and of itself.81 As the Court recognized just 
 
 73. Althouse, supra note 69, at 1253–61. 
 74. 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 75. See generally Note, Last Resorts and Fundamental Rights: The Substantive Due Process 
Implications of Prohibitions on Medical Marijuana, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1985 (2005). 
 76. See Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 866 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 77. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 391 (D. Mass. 2010). 
 78. See Smith, supra note 11, at 1743 (“[T]o be viable as a federalism-based limiting principle, the 
[libertarian objection] needs to bear some relationship to the very reasons why we divide authority 
between the federal government and the states in the first place.”). 
 79. See Siegel, supra note 50; Cooter & Siegel, supra note 41. 
 80. Smith, supra note 11, at 1737–46. 
 81. See Althouse, supra note 69, at 1250; Abigail R. Moncrieff, Cost-Benefit Federalism: 
Reconciling Collective Action Federalism and Libertarian Federalism in the Obamacare Litigation and 
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last term, “[f]ederalism has more than one dynamic.”82 Not only does it “grant 
and delimit the prerogatives and responsibilities of the States and the National 
Government vis-a-vis one another,” federalism also “‘secures to citizens the 
liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.’”83 Similarly, in 
Federalist 51, Madison described the vertical division of powers between 
national and state as part of the “double security” that the Constitution affords 
“to the rights of the people.”84 “Libertarian objections” couched in federalism 
terms are thus hardly “intellectually incoherent”—rather, they stand squarely at 
the center of federalist theory. It is not surprising that Tea Party opponents of 
the ACA describe federalism as “a concept critical for protecting individual 
liberty.”85 
The second problem is that Professor Smith’s objection—which is, to be fair, 
widely shared among the ACA’s defenders—assumes that federalism doctrine 
can, in fact, be constructed as a direct function of its underlying structural 
values. But the age-old debates between formalists and functionalists86 and 
between rules and standards87 cannot be resolved simply by assertion. This is, in 
fact, an important issue that transcends the debate on the ACA. For example, 
as important work by Professors Siegel and Cooter on “collective action 
federalism” becomes more influential,88 there will be increasing efforts to 
reshape judicial federalism doctrine in terms of direct value-application. 
However, many scholars (including this one) have questioned whether courts 
are really institutionally competent to make the complex and policy-laden 
judgments that collective action analysis and other forms of direct value-
application would entail.89 
 
Beyond, 37 AM. J. L. & MED. (forthcoming 2012) (“The kind of liberty at issue here is a generalized 
freedom from governmental restraint. The question for Obamacare under this theory, then, is not 
whether the insurance mandate violates individual rights in a way that ought to receive scrutiny under 
the Fifth Amendment, but rather whether strongly-felt individual objections to the mandate ought to 
counsel in favor of state control.”).  
 82. United States v. Bond, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011). 
 83. Id. (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992)). 
 84. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 351 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed. 1961); see also Ernest 
A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism in the Wake of the War on Terror, 
69 BROOK. L. REV. 1277, 1284–91 (2004) (discussing the ways in which federalism protects liberty). 
 85. FOLEY, supra note 47, at 23. 
 86. See, e.g., Larry Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 
196-97 (“Realist limits [that is, “attempts to track what federalism was really meant to protect”] can 
never effect effective judicial limits on governmental power . . . . If limits are to be found, they must be 
made. And if they are to be made, they will be made only with the tools of a sophisticated formalism.”). 
 87. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of 
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58 (1992) (describing “rules” as captur[ing] the 
background principle or policy in a form that from then on operates independently” and “standards” as 
“tend[ing] to collapse decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background principle or 
policy to a fact situation”). 
 88. See, e.g., Jack Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2010) (using a similar analysis to that 
developed by Professors Cooter and Siegel). 
 89. See, e.g., Moncrieff, supra note 81, at 14 (“Under the models for collective action federalism, 
the permissibility of congressional action depends on extremely difficult and extremely specific 
empirical evaluations of the costs, benefits, and externalities of each and every regulatory question (not 
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Finally, Professor Smith’s discussion suggests that the libertarian objection 
to the ACA is inappropriately opportunistic: By making a federalism argument 
for libertarian purposes, he says, ACA opponents “can only deepen the 
suspicions of those who already view arguments about federalism as simply a 
guise for some other policy agenda.”90 I have argued elsewhere, however, that 
opportunistic federalism arguments are perfectly legitimate—more, they are 
precisely the sort of arguments that the Framers counted on to hold the 
constitutional structure together.91 In Federalist 51, Madison wrote that “[t]he 
interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the 
place,” and that the system would operate by a “policy of supplying by opposite 
and rival interests, the defect of better motives.”92 In this system, federalism—
like every other structural value—is defended by those who have their own 
opportunistic reasons for preferring one decision-maker over another. 
Although some of us strive to be federalism purists, I do not expect to meet 
many who share that passion.93 
* * * 
This discussion hopefully demonstrates why a prudent legal academic ought 
not to bet the 401(k) on the Supreme Court striking down the ACA. This does 
not mean, however, that the challenges to that statute’s constitutionality are 
frivolous or, as Professor Tribe has asserted, “a political objection in legal 
garb.”94 The plaintiffs’ challenge is grounded in bona fide constitutional 
objections; they simply have the misfortune of relying on constitutional 
principles that are underenforced in current doctrine.95 As discussed in the next 
 
just each regulatory regime).”); Young, supra note 3, at 1844–48. 
 90. Smith, supra note 11, at 1746. 
 91. See Young, Dark Side, supra note 84, at 1308–11. 
 92. FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 84, at 349. 
 93. Professor Smith does give one more substantive reason for rejecting federalism arguments that 
seek to protect individual liberty: “[I]f the courts import this libertarian objection into federalism 
doctrine . . . the protection for individual liberty . . . will be even greater than it would be if the 
limitation were imposed as a matter of substantive due process.” Smith, supra note 11, at 1746. That is 
because “[u]nder the latter doctrine, compelling government interests can sometimes justify an 
interference with individual liberty,” but under a federalism argument, “Congress would be 
categorically precluded from compelling individuals to take actions that they would prefer not to take.” 
Id. It is not immediately apparent how much difference this makes—strict scrutiny, after all, is nearly 
always fatal in fact—or that it is necessarily a bad thing to protect individual liberty categorically rather 
than pursuant to a balancing test. But in any event what is clear is that a federalism-based objection 
actually protects individual liberty in a far less categorical fashion than would a successful substantive 
due process claim. That is because the federalism-based objection does nothing to foreclose state 
regulation of the individual decisions in question. 
 94. Tribe, supra note 9. 
 95. It is also an interesting and nonobvious issue whether, as Professor Tribe suggests, a 
“nonpartisan majority of justices” would violate its “constitutional duty” by invalidating the ACA. Id. 
After all, a justice swears her oath to uphold the Constitution—not, I submit, the particular doctrines 
that the Court has developed to implement the Constitution. Those doctrines have the claim of stare 
decisis, of course, but a justice does not violate her oath when she determines that a prior decision 
meets the Court’s criterion for overruling. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 
(1992) (articulating those criteria); see also, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235–36 (1997) 
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part, which doctrines are underenforced is a historically contingent matter. The 
interesting question in the litigation over the ACA is whether the Court might 
once again be prepared to change course. 
III 
THE CONTINGENT NATURE OF UNDERENFORCEMENT 
The underenforcement of constitutional norms is a particular case of the 
Legal Process notion of “institutional settlement.” That notion, which forms the 
heart of Legal Process theory, holds that a critical function of law is to “settle” 
the decision of some questions of law or fact in particular institutions, generally 
based on considerations of comparative institutional competence.96 As Henry 
Hart and Al Sacks explained, institutional settlement “expresses the judgment 
that decisions which are the duly arrived-at result of duly established 
procedures . . . ought to be accepted as binding upon the whole society unless 
and until they are duly changed.”97 Settlement need not be—and generally is 
not—complete; other institutions may review the initial determination through 
established procedures. But the notion of settlement requires that, to at least 
some degree, other institutions will defer to the initial determination even if the 
reviewing institution might have decided the question differently in the first 
place. The right to decide initially, in other words, is the right to get that 
decision “wrong” (from the perspective of other observers, at least) within 
certain bounds.98 Hence, an appellate court has a right to review the trial court’s 
decisions of both fact and law, but it will generally defer to the trial court’s 
resolution of the factual issues on account of that court’s superior institutional 
position (for example, it sees the witnesses firsthand) as long as that resolution 
meets some minimum threshold level of plausibility.99 
When a court underenforces a constitutional norm, it does not purport to 
 
(collecting cases and noting that stare decisis is “not an inexorable command” but “a policy judgment” 
that “is at its weakest when we interpret the Constitution because our interpretation can be altered 
only by constitutional amendment or by overruling our prior decisions”). Presumably, Tribe does not 
think that the Court that developed the current, highly deferential doctrines violated its constitutional 
duty by departing from the prior dual federalist regime in cases like Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 
(1942). But unless we think that current doctrine is simply “true”—that it is congruent with the full 
conceptual meaning of the relevant constitutional principles rather than simply an instance of 
prudential underenforcement—a current justice would have the same option of recalibrating the 
appropriate level of doctrinal deference. 
 96. See HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 2001) (1953); 
see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart & Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953, 
971–75 (1994) (discussing the place of this principle in Legal Process thought). 
 97. HART & SACKS, supra note 96, at 4. 
 98. See Fallon, supra note 96, at 962 (“[A]uthority to decide must at least sometimes include 
authority to decide wrongly.”). 
 99. See, e.g., Penncro Assocs., Inc. v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 499 F.3d 1151, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that appellants face a difficult burden in establishing “clear error” because “in a bench trial, . . 
. the district court . . . enjoys the benefit of live testimony and has the opportunity firsthand to weigh 
credibility and evidence”). 
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limit the force of that norm; it simply defers the initial determination of how 
that norm should apply in particular circumstances to some other actor. For 
instance, when McCulloch v. Maryland established a deferential standard for 
reviewing whether an unenumerated means (creating a national bank) was 
“necessary and proper” to accomplish some enumerated end under Article I 
(collecting taxes, creating a currency, raising armies, et cetera),100 the Court was 
not saying that necessity is a trivial requirement. Rather, the deferential 
standard of judicial review signifies that the initial determination of necessity is 
“settled” in Congress and the President, and courts should not disturb that 
determination unless it falls outside broad bounds of reasonableness.101 
Similarly, Justice Souter has described “[t]he practice of deferring to rationally 
based legislative judgments [as] ‘a paradigm of judicial restraint.’”102 “In judicial 
review under the Commerce Clause,” he explains, this practice “reflects our 
respect for the institutional competence of the Congress on a subject expressly 
assigned to it by the Constitution and our appreciation of the legitimacy that 
comes from Congress’s political accountability in dealing with matters open to a 
wide range of possible choices.”103 
Some doctrinal rules that settle institutional authority in this way, like the 
McCulloch standard, last a long time. But others change significantly over the 
course of a few decades. The constitutional norms that were underenforced in 
1920, for example, were quite different than the norms that were underenforced 
in 1965. This part seeks to identify some factors influencing decisions to 
underenforce particular constitutional principles and illustrates how those 
factors may change over time. Before turning to that discussion, however, I deal 
with a potential objection. 
A. How Do We Know that Federalism is Underenforced? 
The notion that a constitutional principle may be “under-” or 
“overenforced” seems to imply that there must also be some optimal point at 
which that principle would simply be, well, enforced. And one might also 
assume that before we can sensibly speak of over- or underenforcement, we 
must identify what that true or best meaning of the constitutional principle is. 
We cannot, in other words, know whether courts are erring, and in which 
direction, unless we know where we would actually like to be. If this view is 
correct, then my discussion so far suffers from a rather large omission: I have 
 
 100. 17 U.S. 316, 352–60 (1819). 
 101. For this reason, President Andrew Jackson’s subsequent veto of the Bank on constitutional 
grounds did not necessarily represent a “disagreement” with McCulloch, but rather was an exercise of 
the authority that the Court had left with the political branches. McCulloch held, in other words, that 
the political branches get to decide whether a Bank is “necessary”—not that the Bank is necessary. 
President Jackson, speaking for the Executive Branch, was willing to say that it was not. See ARTHUR 
M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON 88–92 (1945). 
 102. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 604 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting FCC v. Beach 
Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993)). 
 103. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 604. 
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not made any effort to define the “true” conceptual meaning of constitutional 
federalism or, for that matter, of economic liberty. 
The objection requires inquiry into two distinct questions: First, do 
constitutional principles actually have a fixed, “true” meaning that is distinct 
from the doctrines that courts use to enforce them? Second, to what extent do 
we need to identify that meaning in order to talk intelligently about whether 
doctrine under- or overenforces the principle in question? The answer to the 
first question, in my view, is clause-specific. Some constitutional principles do 
have a single determinate meaning; As Fred Schauer has pointed out, the 
difficulty of interpreting some portions of the Constitution should not blind us 
to the fact that there are also “easy cases.”104 The President, for example, must 
be at least thirty-five years old.105 Unfortunately, these provisions with clear and 
determinate meanings generally require little judicial enforcement, and thus 
little doctrine. In these situations where it would be easy to tell if a provision 
were being over or underenforced, the problem generally does not arise. 
Other constitutional principles, however, are considerably less determinate 
as a matter of text, and these typically are the principles that require judges to 
develop doctrinal rules that implement them in particular situations. The 
potential for a gap between conceptual and doctrinal meaning—the predicate 
for over- and underenforcement—thus arises in precisely those situations where 
we are least likely to reach consensus on the meaning of the underlying 
concepts. Even if your humble author were allowed the space to develop a 
complete parent concept of federalism, it is unclear what good that would do; 
other academics, not to mention judges and politicians, would no doubt frame 
the concept differently. If we must agree about a single true concept of “due 
process” or “federalism” before we can discuss whether those principles are 
under- or overenforced in current doctrine, then the latter discussion is unlikely 
ever to get off the ground. 
It should be possible, however, to reach widespread agreement on a 
relatively thin version of at least some constitutional principles.106 This may be 
especially true on the structural side of constitutional law, where the central 
principles of federalism and separation of powers may usefully be framed in 
terms of a balance among competing institutions. One need not agree on 
precisely where the balance should be struck to think that some meaningful 
balance is required. A thin conception of federalism might take its cues from 
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden:107 The enumeration of 
national powers presupposes something not enumerated; each level of 
government should retain important competences; and a (relatively) neutral 
 
 104. Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 399–408 (1985). 
 105. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (stating that “neither shall any person be eligible to that office 
who shall not have attained to the age of thirty five years”). 
 106. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1733–42 
(1985). 
 107. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 187–239 (1824). I am using Gibbons, of course, precisely because it is so 
frequently cited by nationalists to justify a broad vision of national legislative authority.  
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judicial arbiter should referee the jurisdictional disputes that arise between the 
nation and the states. It is not hard to find support for each of these 
propositions even from people and decisions that otherwise embrace widely 
varying views of national power vis-à-vis the states.108 Much room for 
disagreement remains as to where to draw the relevant lines. But sometimes the 
doctrine adopted by courts will fall outside this zone of reasonable conceptual 
meanings. In those cases, it makes sense to say that the the underlying concept 
is over- or underenforced. 
The second question, then, is whether this thin conception of federalism is 
sufficient to ground a meaningful discussion of whether a constitutional norm is 
underenforced. I submit that it is. Consider the first aspect of Gibbons noted 
above—Chief Justice Marshall’s notion that the principle of enumerated powers 
 
 108. On the first proposition, enumerated powers, see, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 
301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937) (“The authority of the federal government may not be pushed to such an extreme 
as to destroy the distinction, which the commerce clause itself establishes, between commerce ‘among 
the several States’ and the internal concerns of a State.”); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
(1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (insisting that “[t]o hold this statute constitutional is not to ‘obliterate’ 
the ‘distinction between what is national and what is local’” and suggesting that the Federal 
Government would lack power “to regulate ‘marriage, divorce, and child custody,’ or to regulate any 
and all aspects of education”) (quoting id. at 564, 567 (majority opinion)); Matthew Adler, State 
Sovereignty and the Anti-Commandeering Cases, 574 ANNALS 158, 161 (2001) (“[D]oes our 
Constitution limit the powers of the national government and reserve regulatory powers to the states? 
The answer—and it is hard to see how there could even be reasonable disagreement on this score—is 
yes. . . . In short, there are at least some types of legislation (such as laws regulating wholly intrastate 
activities) that the Constitution permits states to enact but disempowers the national government from 
enacting.”). 
  On the second proposition, preservation of meaningful competences for both state and federal 
governments, see JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 170–80 (1996) (recounting how nationalist efforts at the Philadelphia Convention 
truly to subordinate the States were defeated, and the ultimate compromises protected a meaningful 
role for state governments); THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 200 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke 
ed. 1961) (“[A]s the plan of the convention aims only at a partial Union or consolidation, the State 
Governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had and which were 
not by that act exclusively delegated to the United States.”); Koen Lenaerts, Federalism: Essential 
Concepts in Evolution-The Case of the European Union, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 746, 748 (1998) 
(“[F]ederalism searches for the balance between the desire to create and/or to retain an efficient central 
authority . . . and the concern of the component entities to keep or gain their autonomy so that they can 
defend their own interests.”).  
  On the third proposition, judicial review, see, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 578 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he federal balance is too essential a part of our constitutional structure and plays too 
vital a role in securing freedom for us to admit inability to intervene when one or the other level of 
Government has tipped the scales too far.”); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of 
Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2224 n.197 (1998) (“[T]o declare federalism limits 
unenforceable is destabilizing and that the possibility of judicial enforcement is conducive to more 
responsible governance consistent with constitutional traditions and judicial competencies.”); Koen 
Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 205, 263 (1990) 
(“Federalism is present whenever a divided sovereign is guaranteed by a national or supranational 
constitution and umpired by the supreme court of the common legal order.”) (emphasis added); Herbert 
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and 
Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 559 (1954) (emphasizing non-judicial 
checks on national authority, but acknowledging that “[t]his is not to say that the Court can decline to 
measure national enactments by the Constitution when it is called upon to face the question in the 
course of ordinary litigation; the supremacy clause governs there as well”). 
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“presupposes something not enumerated.” As Gary Lawson has remarked, “in 
this day and age, discussing the doctrine of enumerated powers is like discussing 
the redemption of Imperial Chinese bonds. There is now virtually no significant 
aspect of life that is not in some way regulated by the federal government.”109 
Professor Lawson made that observation a year before United States v. Lopez110 
shocked the legal community by actually striking down an Act of Congress on 
the ground that it exceeded the commerce power, but does anyone really think 
that Lopez and Morrison fundamentally restored the enumerated powers 
doctrine? Those cases were important for any number of reasons—most 
importantly, because they signaled to the political branches, as well as to state 
politicians and citizens generally, that enumerated powers remains an important 
constitutional principle.111 But there is precious little that those decisions 
actually prevented Congress from doing.112 
One might insist that it is simply impossible to talk about underenforcement 
of federalism (or any other constitutional norm) without defining the norm’s 
true conceptual meaining and showing that judicial doctrine falls, not just short, 
but significantly short of enforcing it. This is not how the underenforcement 
literature proceeds, however. Dean Sager’s important article, for example, 
identified any number of underenforced constitutional norms without stopping 
to develop a thick and complete account of their conceptual meaning.113 
Likewise, we would not need to develop a thick account of the theoretical limits 
of free speech to say that decisions like Schenck v. United States114 
underenforced that principle. A requirement of precise definition would 
ultimately be self-defeating, because underenforcement typically arises in 
 
 109. Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1236 
(1994). 
 110. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 111. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court: A Normative Defense, 574 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 24, 34 (2001) (“Underenforced, but symbolic, laws against drug 
use, like underenforced, but symbolic, federalism cases, serve important social purposes. They teach the 
public about the proper hierarchy of norms and values, and in legislative bodies they help to set the 
agenda for policymaking debates.”). Hence, I have long agreed with Mr. Leitch that such decisions are 
often part of a “dialectic” occurring between the Court and the public. See Bryan Leitch, On the 
Difficulty of Separating Law and Politics: Federalism and the Affordable Care Act, 75 Law & Contemp. 
Probs., no. 3, 2012, at 207; Young, supra note 37, at 165 (suggesting that decisions like Lopez serve a 
“cueing function for Congress” and also “may encourage Congress and the states to negotiate more 
rational allocations of authority within the broad confines prescribed by the Court”). 
 112. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (defining Congress’s power extremely broadly, 
notwithstanding Lopez and Morrison); see also Baker, supra note 61, at 1911 (noting that holdings like 
Lopez can easily be circumvented through spending conditions). 
 113. Lawrence Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 
HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1214 (1978). 
 114. 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (upholding convictions under the Espionage Act for distributing leaflets 
opposing the military draft). If one prefers to think of cases like Schenck as simply mistakes, rather than 
as instances of underenforcement, then consider Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), which 
required proof of discriminatory purpose rather than mere disparate impact to make out an Equal 
Protection claim. Although reasonable people may disagree about whether Davis underenforces the 
Equal Protection Clause, one need not have a fully developed conception of equal protection in order 
to discuss the issue.  
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precisely those areas where the underlying norms are most difficult to define 
with precision. 
It is unlikely that the Constitution specifies a single, precise meaning for 
balancing norms like federalism and separation of powers—but this hardly 
requires advocates of greater restraints on national power to pack up our tents 
and go home. As I have discussed at greater length elsewhere,115 the difficulty of 
identifying a precise point of “true” constitutional equilibrium does not make it 
impossible to observe, in the present age, that the system is out of balance in 
favor of national power.116 Indeed, the best reply to skeptics that federalism is 
underenforced may simply be to say, “Look around you!” One can argue that 
underenforcement is good because national power is better than state power, or 
that it is the only way to prevent the more serious evil of judicial activism. But I 
have a hard time seeing how one could deny that “underenforcement” 
accurately describes the present state of the law on federalism. 
B. Why Do Courts Underenforce? 
A variety of considerations influence the appropriate allocation of authority 
between institutions in our legal system. Some of these are relatively hard-
wired: Trial courts will always be closer to the facts than appellate courts, for 
example; likewise, administrative agencies have no comparative expertise 
advantage over reviewing courts on questions of constitutional law. Some may 
even be constitutionally mandated: The Court’s recent decision in Stern v. 
Marshall, for example, seems to mean that the Constitution limits the degree of 
deference that Article III courts may accord to decisions on private rights 
rendered by non-Article III bankruptcy courts.117 One would expect the 
influence of these sorts of factors to be relatively stable over time. 
One factor that has played a significant role in the federalism decisions is 
the Court’s ability to develop determinate doctrinal rules to implement a 
particular constitutional principle. Larry Lessig has called this factor the 
“Frankfurter Constraint,” after then-Professor Felix Frankfurter’s analysis of 
the Supreme Court’s nineteenth century decisions construing the boundaries of 
dual federalism under the Commerce Clause.118 Frankfurter’s account 
emphasized the Court’s need and desire to avoid the appearance of “judicial 
policy-making”119—in Alexander Hamilton’s terms, to be seen as exercising 
“judgment,” not “will.”120 Professor Lessig contends that this requirement is 
 
 115. See Young, supra note 3, 1803–11. 
 116. See, e.g., Timothy Zick, Statehood as the New Personhood: The Discovery of Fundamental 
“States’ Rights”, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 213, 215 (2004) (“Federal power and supremacy long ago 
eclipsed state power, no matter what barometer one consults.”).  
 117. 131 S. Ct. 2591, 2595–99 (2011). 
 118. See FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY, AND 
WAITE (1937); Larry Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 
174.  
 119. See FRANKFURTER, supra note 118, at 54.  
 120. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 526 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961).  
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fundamental to judicial legitimacy.121 “[A] rule is an inferior rule,” he writes, “if, 
in its application, it appears to be political, in the sense of appearing to allow 
extra-legal factors to control its application.”122 And when the Court perceives 
that it is incurring costs to its legitimacy by pursuing a doctrinal rule perceived 
to be political, we can expect the Court to abandon that rule and try something 
else.123 
The ultimate expression of the Frankfurter Constraint is the aspect of the 
political question doctrine that holds some constitutional claims nonjusticiable 
if they are not subject to resolution by “judicially manageable standards.”124 But 
instances of outright nonjusticiability are rare; generally, the courts will be 
willing to decide a class of claims, but because of concerns about the 
indeterminacy of the operative constitutional principles they will adopt a 
deferential doctrinal rule. The courts remain willing to adjudicate claims 
predicated on economic substantive due process, for instance, but because of 
the indeterminacy of the underlying principle they have chosen an extremely 
deferential standard.125 Likewise, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected 
Jesse Choper’s invitation to declare all federalism claims nonjusticiable,126 but it 
has adopted a set of doctrines under the Commerce Clause that effectively 
settles in Congress the primary judgment as to whether a given statute falls 
within national power.127 
There is little doubt that the extreme line-drawing problems associated with 
defining separate and exclusive spheres of federal and state authority 
contributed significantly to the collapse of the dual federalism regime during 
the 1930s and early 1940s.128 The same can be—and has been—said of the New 
Deal Court’s retreat from enforcing economic liberty under the Due Process 
Clause, which required increasingly indeterminate judgments about whether 
 
 121. See Lessig, supra note 118, at 174 (“To the extent that results of a particular rule appear 
consistent, it is easier for the legal culture to view this rule as properly judicial, and its results as 
properly judicial . . . . To the extent, however, that the results appear inconsistent, this pedigree gets 
questioned; it becomes easier for observers to view these results as determined, or influenced, by 
factors external to the rule—in particular, factors considered political.”). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 174–75. 
 124. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962); 
see generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 1274 (2006). 
 125. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (“It is enough 
that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative 
measure was a rational way to correct it.”). 
 126. Compare JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A 
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 171–259 (1980), with 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610–19 (2000) (rejecting the dissent’s argument that the 
Constitution “remits [Commerce Clause issues] to politics”). 
 127. This approach is probably more faithful than Dean Choper’s to the “original meaning” of 
Herbert Wechsler’s discussion of the “political safeguards of federalism.” See Ernest A. Young, The 
Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 71 (2004). 
 128. See, e.g., CUSHMAN, supra note 29, at 47–84; Young, supra note 31.  
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particular industries were “affected with a public interest.”129 At the same time, 
it seems unlikely that the present underenforcement of federalism and 
economic liberty can be attributed wholly to the indeterminacy of the 
underlying constitutional principles. After all, there are a variety of areas in 
which both the underlying principles and the doctrines that the Court has 
devised to implement them are highly indeterminate, and yet the Court 
continues to enforce these rules. 
Consider, for example, the basic principle of personal privacy in Griswold v. 
Connecticut130—a decision so widely supported that Robert Bork’s questioning 
of it made him radioactive as a nominee to the high court.131 Controversy rages 
over particular extensions of Griswold’s principle (particularly to abortion), but 
the Court’s role in protecting privacy rights seems well-established, and the 
Court continues to extend Griswold with considerable confidence.132 Or 
consider the Court’s revival of economic substantive due process itself in BMW 
v. Gore, which claimed a role for the Court reviewing punitive damages awards 
under the Due Process Clause.133 Aside from a few annoying cranks (including 
this one) who thought BMW amounted to a return to the Lochner era, no one 
seems that upset about BMW, and the Court appears to see relatively little need 
to defer to other institutions in enforcing the relevant principles. This is true 
notwithstanding the almost total lack, under both Griswold and BMW, of 
determinate standards for defining and applying the doctrine. 
Other examples abound. The Court’s well established “standard”—if one 
can even call it that—for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause is 
whether the defendant has “minimum contacts” with the forum state.134 It 
applies a general rule of “reasonableness” to searches under the Fourth 
Amendment.135 An aggressive recent line of cases has limited state imposition of 
capital punishment as “cruel and unusual” under the Eighth Amendment based 
on the Court’s own moral intuitions, a highly tendentious approach to counting 
the positions of state jurisdictions, and occasional references to foreign law.136 
My point is not that these cases are wrong; I approve of several of them and can 
live with many of the others. What is interesting, however, is that despite 
 
 129. See CUSHMAN, supra note 29, at 104–05, 154–55. 
 130. 381 U.S. 479, 484–86 (1965). 
 131. For Judge Bork’s critique, see Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment 
Problems, 47 IND. L. REV. 1 (1971). See also FRIEDMAN, supra note 18, at 317 (citing Bork’s opposition 
to Griswold as one of the “main issues” triggering opposition to his nomination). 
 132. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564–79 (2003) (recognizing a right to engage in gay 
sex under the Due Process clause). 
 133. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 563–74 (1996). 
 134. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 135. See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960) (“[W]hat the Constitution forbids is 
not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.”). 
 136. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (holding that capital punishment for child 
rape violates the Eighth Amendment); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (striking down the 
juvenile death penalty under the Eighth Amendment); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding 
that executing the mentally disabled violates the Eighth Amendment). 
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significant Frankfurter Constraint problems in each of these areas, the Court 
has not felt the need to develop doctrines that underenforce the relevant 
constitutional principles. 
Something more than indeterminacy must be going on with 
underenforcement. I submit that that “something more” has much to do with 
the social and political context in which the Court formulates doctrine. Both 
popular constitutionalism and the responses of other political actors influence 
when the Court will take the lead on implementing particular constitutional 
principles, and when it will settle primary authority to implement those 
principles in other actors by developing doctrines that underenforce the 
relevant norms. This dynamic reflects the Court’s need not only to be faithful to 
legal principle but to make sure the law “accounts for the conditions of its own 
legitimation”—to practice, in my friend Neil Siegel’s terms, “the virtue of 
judicial statesmanship.”137 
The influence of popular constitutionalism is, of course, notoriously hard to 
pin down. It may be useful to think of that influence as having both a 
substantive and an institutional component. That is, the Court pays heed not 
only to popular attitudes on particular constitutional issues, but also to more 
general public views on the legitimacy and appropriate scope of judicial review 
itself. The Court may well be more willing to enforce constitutional principles, 
despite the indeterminacy of the available doctrinal formulae, when it believes 
that the underlying principles have strong public support and when it believes 
the public’s general approval of judicial review to be strong. This view would 
account for the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts’ willingness to intervene, in a 
fairly aggressive way, on a number of issues despite the absence of determinate 
doctrinal rules. On gay rights, for example, Lawrence eschewed traditional 
doctrinal tests in favor of a highly amorphous concept of “liberty,” but the 
Court was moving in line with broader social trends on the issue in question and 
also enjoyed high levels of diffuse support.138 Similarly, one can hardly explain 
the Court’s willingness to decide difficult cases about affirmative action and 
race-based preferences by pointing to highly determinate rules that the Court 
has developed for such cases; rather, the Court’s relatively non-deferential 
stance in this area seems better grounded in the fact that “an equivocating 
Court matched a confused public somewhere in the middle on the issue.”139 If 
this is right, then we can expect underenforcement to occur primarily in 
particular areas where the Court is unsure of public support for its results, or at 
times when more diffuse support for judicial review generally is in question. 
Current doctrine on federalism and economic liberty reflects a profound 
change since the 1930s in public expectations of the general role of government 
 
 137. Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959, 963 (2008). 
 138. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 18, at 359–60 (noting a “remarkable” “transformation in public 
debate and opinion” on the issue); id. at 15 (noting high levels of diffuse support in the Rehnquist 
Court era). 
 139. Id. at 361. 
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in society and of the role of the national government in particular. But it also 
reflects a change in public expectations of the role of the Court over the same 
period. The next section sketches how both sets of expectations evolved in ways 
that encouraged the Court to underenforce constitutional norms of federalism 
and economic liberty. Part IV then suggests ways in which those expectations 
might be changing again. 
C. Underenforcement Over Time 
As a thought experiment, consider the constitutional world of 1920. 
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court increasingly saw 
its role as protecting individual economic liberties and the free market against 
increasing incursions by both state and national government.140 It did this 
primarily through the doctrine of freedom of contract expressed in cases like 
Allgeyer v. Louisiana141 and Lochner v. New York,142 although it is important to 
understand that the Court viewed freedom of contract as just one manifestation 
of a broader right of individual self-determination that also included less overtly 
economic liberties such as freedom of worship and the right to rear one’s 
children without undue interference from the State.143 Although the Court 
upheld as many statutes as it struck down during this period,144 the Court’s 
“reasonableness” test for incursions on economic liberty was relatively 
undeferential to political actors.145 Economic liberty was not, in other words, 
underenforced. 
Neither was the Commerce Clause. Although the Court sometimes allowed 
national regulation of intrastate activity when such regulation was necessary to 
implement a viable regime governing interstate commerce,146 the Court retained 
confidence in its ability to draw principled lines between “commerce” and 
antecedent activities like manufacturing,147 between goods that were “in the 
stream of [interstate] commerce” and those that were not,148 and between 
“direct” and “indirect” effects on interstate commerce.149 The Court drew these 
 
 140. See generally MCCLOSKEY, supra note 29, at 96–117. 
 141. 165 U.S. 578, 590–92 (1897). 
 142. 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905). 
 143. See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 
390, 399 (1923). 
 144. See CUSHMAN, supra note 29; Tony A. Freyer, Book Review, Brandeis and the Progressive 
Constitution: Erie, The Judicial Power, and the Politics of the Federal Courts in Twentieth Century 
America by Edward A. Purcell, Jr., 18 CONST. COMMENT. 267, 270 n.8 (2001) (“The objective fact that 
the Lochner era had a low rate of invalidation has been noted by historians and lawyers for some 
time.”). 
 145. See, e.g., Lochner, 198 U.S. at 59 (“There must be more than the mere fact of the possible 
existence of some small amount of unhealthiness to warrant legislative interference with liberty. It is 
unfortunately true that labor, even in any department, may possibly carry with it the seeds of 
unhealthiness. But are we all, on that account, at the mercy of legislative majorities?”).  
 146. See, e.g., Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 350–55 (1914). 
 147. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 13–18 (1895). 
 148. Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 518–28 (1922). 
 149. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 11–18. 
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lines, moreover, notwithstanding its recognition that they raised significant 
indeterminacy problems.150 
Many constitutional norms, however, were underenforced in 1920. Plessy v. 
Ferguson’s refusal to challenge Jim Crow segregation under the Equal 
Protection Clause, for example, was grounded not only in racist attitudes on the 
merits (reflecting attitudes in the broader society) but also in institutional 
pessimism concerning the capacity of the federal courts to effect social 
change.151 Justice Holmes’s seminal dissents in the World War I free speech 
cases remained just that—dissents—as the Court upheld restrictions on antiwar 
speech in cases like Schenck152 and Abrams.153 These cases naturally reflected the 
unpopularity of dissent as well as institutional deference to the political 
branches on questions of national security. Finally, the First Amendment’s 
Religion Clauses had been ineffectual in stopping the Mormon persecutions in 
the late nineteenth century,154 and the federal courts had taken no steps to limit 
daily Bible reading and prayer in the public schools.155 
One could identify many other examples, but these should suffice to make 
the basic point. Nowadays, we would consider underenforcement of the Equal 
Protection, Free Speech, and Religion Clauses virtually unthinkable.156 The 
Court’s primacy in these areas is well-established, and the contemporary 
doctrinal rules that implement these provisions are generally rigorous and non-
 
 150. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554 (1935) (Cardozo, 
J., concurring) (acknowledging that “[t]here is a view of causation that would obliterate the distinction 
between what is national and what is local in the activities of commerce,” but insisting that “[t]he law is 
not indifferent to considerations of degree”). The Court also plainly recognized the relation between 
federalism-based limitations on government action and individual economic liberties. Enforcing limits 
on the Commerce Clause, after all, prevented national interference with the free market at the same 
time that the Court’s rigorous enforcement of the dormant Commerce Clause worked alongside the 
Due Process cases to prevent state interference. See generally Stephen A. Gardbaum, New Deal 
Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the States, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 483 (1997). 
 151. 163 U.S. 537, 551–52 (1896) (observing that social equality of the races “‘can neither be 
accomplished nor promoted by laws which conflict with the general sentiment of the community . . . .’ If 
one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon 
the same plane”) (quoting People v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438, 448 (1883)). 
 152. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 53 (1919). 
 153. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919). 
 154. See, e.g., Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (upholding a federal statute requiring Mormons 
to disavow the teachings of the church); Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890) (upholding a federal statute dissolving the Mormon Church and 
seizing its property); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding convictions for 
polygamy against a Free Exercise challenge). 
 155. See MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, JOHN H. GARVEY & THOMAS C. BERG, RELIGION AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 483 (2d ed. 2006). Of course, the Establishment Clause was not even incorporated 
against the States until 1947, in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). But the refusal to 
interpret the Fourteenth Amendment as applying particular Bill of Rights protections to the States is 
not that different from underenforcement—after all, the effect of nonincorporation was to defer issues 
of religious liberty to state institutions. 
 156. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (establishing a presumption of irreparable 
injury in free speech cases where the plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, because “[t]he loss of First 
Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable 
injury”). 
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deferential toward other actors. Indeed, while modern courts deciding 
federalism and economic liberty cases eschew the right to sit as a 
“superlegislature,”157 courts plainly do perform this function in the broad range 
of cases in which they have adopted implementing doctrines of “strict scrutiny.” 
In such cases, courts second-guess the factual determinations of legislatures, 
insist on the least restrictive possible means of pursuing state interests, and rule 
out many state interests as simply insufficiently weighty to warrant imposition 
on fundamental rights.158 This approach may well be appropriate in many 
instances, but we should be clear on the fact that courts do frequently sit as 
“superlegislatures,” and the decisions about when and where they do so are 
drawn not from the underlying constitutional principles, but from contingent 
institutional judgments that change over time. 
The relevant changes are familiar history. The Depression seriously 
damaged not only laissez faire faith in the free market but also confidence in 
state governments as the primary actors responsible for addressing domestic 
social ills. In the wake of the New Deal, the public came to expect and rely 
upon a significant role for government in regulating the economy and 
guaranteeing basic social welfare.159 And the Supreme Court, which had fought 
these changes during the 1930s, emerged weak and chastened.160 It is not 
entirely easy to summarize the areas of underenforcement under the “double 
standard” of judicial review that emerged in the 1940s and 1950s,161 but one 
explanation that works as well as any is that the Court stopped doing what it 
had been doing when it got in trouble. Federalism and economic liberty would 
be underenforced, and the Court would try to carve out a new niche for itself in 
areas of civil liberties that it had previously neglected.162 
 
 157. See, e.g., Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1328–65 (11th Cir. 
2011) (Marcus, J., dissenting). 
 158. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738–42 (2011) (striking down 
California’s attempt to regulate violent videogames under a First Amendment strict scrutiny standard). 
 159. See, e.g., DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN 
DEPRESSION AND WAR, 1929-1945, 379 (1999) (“Above all, the New Deal gave to countless Americans 
who had never had much of it a sense of security, and with it a sense of having a stake in their 
country.”). 
 160. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 862 (1992) (discussing the Lochner 
Court’s failure to adapt constitutional doctrine to changing economic circumstances and concluding 
that “the Court lost something by its misperception, or its lack of prescience, and the Court-packing 
crisis only magnified the loss”). 
 161. See generally Lynn Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial 
Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 80–85 (2001) (trying and failing). 
 162. Some of the ACA’s defenders have asserted that the Act’s broad assertion of national power is 
faithful not only to the post-New Deal settlement but also to the Framers’ original intent. See, e.g., 
Simon Lazarus, The Health Care Lawsuits: Unraveling a Century of Constitutional Law and the Fabric 
of Modern American Government, AM. CONST. SOC’Y 4 (Feb. 2011), http://www.acslaw.org/ 
sites/default/ files/lazarus_-_health_reform_lawsuits_0.pdf (“[I]t would be more accurate to view what 
libertarian critics call the New Deal Supreme Court’s ‘revolution of 1937’ as a restoration of the vision 
of the original Framers, who sought to supplant the feckless Articles of Confederation with a charter 
for effective and responsive national governance.”). This assertion relies on broad language in Marshall 
Court decisions like McCulloch and Gibbons, see id., but of course those decisions upheld quite modest 
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This it did with considerable success. But the story I have told should make 
clear the highly contingent nature of underenforcement. Underenforcement is 
not, in at least most cases, a natural or inevitable quality of particular 
constitutional norms. Rather, the patterns of under- and overenforcement 
change over time in response to events, conditions, and public attitudes. And 
what can change once can change again. 
IV 
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE HEALTHCARE DEBATE 
Michael Dorf has recognized that “the meaning of the Constitution is never 
finally settled. Even long-lasting resolutions of particular controversies can be 
re-opened when the People are moved to action.”163 If this is true of 
constitutional meaning, it is doubly true of the doctrinal constructs that courts 
develop to implement that meaning. This last part considers the prospect that 
aspects of popular constitutionalism may prompt the Court to revisit its 
doctrines that presently underenforce principles of federalism and economic 
liberty. I do not wish to be read as endorsing popular constitutionalism as a 
normatively legitimate form of constitutional change; indeed, it has always 
seemed to me that a primary purpose of constitutionalism is precisely to 
entrench certain principles and structures against change, particular change 
driven by popular pressure.164 Nor do I want to embrace any particular theory as 
to how popular constitutionalism operates. As a descriptive matter, however, it 
is hard to deny that changes in public attitudes have their impact on 
constitutional interpretation. This last part addresses how those forces may play 
out in with respect to the debate over the ACA. 
The suits challenging the ACA take place in the context of a broader 
popular debate concerning the role of government in general and the national 
government in particular. Although the plaintiffs naturally insist that the courts 
can strike down the ACA without departing from present doctrine, it is plain 
 
federal programs and nothing approaching the magnitude of the ACA’s regulatory scheme appeared 
until the middle third of the Twentieth Century. Despite attempts to develop an originalist pedigree for 
the ACA and other components of contemporary progressives’ constitutional vision, see, e.g., Balkin, 
supra note 88, at 15–47, the more persuasive strand of progressive scholarship acknowledges the need 
to ground the New Deal in either novel theories of constitutional amendment, see, e.g., BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: VOLUME 2: TRANSFORMATIONS (2000), or notions of “living 
constitutionalism,” see, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 
B.U. L. REV. 222, 204, 222–24 (1980). 
 163. Michael C. Dorf, Nullification, Secession, and Guns Show Constitutional Meaning is Never 
Settled, FINDLAW’S WRIT, Feb. 24, 2010, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20100224.html.  
 164. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 18, at 372–74 (identifying, as the crucial question, whether the 
Supreme Court is sufficiently independent of popular opinion to enforce constitutional principle in the 
face of majority disapproval); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 177 YALE 
L.J. 408 (2007) (identifying entrenchment as a key purpose of constitutions). Many instances of popular 
constitutionalism, moreover, are spectacularly unattractive. See, e.g., Lucas A. Powe, Jr., Are “the 
People” Missing in Action (and Should Anyone Care)?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 855, 866–70 (2005) (identifying 
the South’s “massive resistance” to Brown v. Board of Education as an instance of popular 
constitutionalism). 
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that the lawsuits are also part of a broader effort to articulate a more libertarian 
vision of the government’s authority over the individual and a more federalist 
vision of the reach of national power.165 The disdainful rhetoric with which the 
ACA’s defenders have greeted the lawsuits should also be viewed as part of this 
essential process of constitutional contestation. Constitutional law trades on 
broad societal intuitions about what is “normal”—in individual conduct,166 in the 
scope of government authority,167 and in the role of the courts.168 Thus, when 
defenders of the present equilibrium say the case is “easy” and depict those who 
disagree as unsophisticated and in need of a good Constitutional Law I class,169 
they are seeking to defend and preserve the currently prevailing view of 
constitutional normalcy. But this view reflects the current state of doctrine, with 
its areas of significant underenforcement, rather than some absolute truth of the 
underlying principles themselves. Should the defenders of the status quo lose 
their argument in the ACA cases, something quite different may seem 
“normal” or even inevitable a half century hence. 
In assessing the current debate, moreover, it is important to recognize how 
dramatically the “New Deal settlement” in constitutional law has already 
changed in the intervening years. That settlement saw a Court in retreat, 
eschewing challenges to the political branches virtually across the board. By the 
next decade, however, the Court had taken up the cause of noneconomic 
rights—first racial equality,170 then criminal procedure,171 equal voting,172 and 
 
 165. See, e.g., Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, E. Duncan Getchell, Jr., & Wesley G. Russell, Jr., Why the 
Debate Over the Constitutionality of the Federal Health Care Law is About Much More than Health 
Care, 15 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 293, 334–38 (2011) (essay, by the Virginia Attorney General and senior 
staff, grounding Virginia’s suit challenging the ACA in a broader vision of limited government); but see 
id. at 295 (“No existing doctrine needs to be curtailed or expanded for Virginia to prevail on the 
merits.”). 
 166. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950–51 (2012) (relying on social conventions to 
define the meaning of a “search” under the Fourth Amendment); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1991) (relying on broad social understandings of the relationship 
between reproductive liberty and women’s roles in considering the stare decisis force of Roe v. Wade). 
 167. See, e.g., Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, L.L.C., 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2718–19 (2009) (interpreting 
the scope of preemption under the National Bank Act by reference to settled understandings that state 
agencies have authority to enforce state laws against state banks); Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. 
Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012–2013) 
(exploring the degree to which settled practice defines the constitutional separation of powers).  
 168. See, e.g., Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (noting, in holding that the trial court 
improperly certified a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, that “[w]e are presented 
with on of the most expansive class actions ever”); Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654, 681 (1988) 
(resolving whether Congress may vest certain powers concerning independent counsel in the courts by 
determining that those powers were analogous to other powers the courts had long exercised). 
 169. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 9; Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at 3. Indeed, Dean Chemerinsky’s 
essay for this symposium undertakes to preemptively “spin” a possible Supreme Court decision striking 
down the ACA as the next Bush v. Gore. See id. at 2; see also Koppelman, supra note 11, at 1 (making a 
similar attempt to spin an adverse Supreme Court ruling on the ACA as nothing more than partisan 
politics). 
 170. Brown v. Bd. of Educ, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 171. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 347 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 172. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
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ultimately privacy.173 With the privacy cases, moreover, the Court had reversed 
its rejection of substantive due process review during the New Deal.174 For a 
similar set of transformations, consider the Court’s national security 
jurisprudence. The New Deal Court was prepared largely to rubber-stamp the 
Executive’s judgments on national security, as it did in the Japanese Internment 
case.175 During a lesser conflict in the 1950s, the Court was more willing to 
challenge the Executive in the Steel Seizure case,176 but the Warren Court 
remained extremely hesitant to block national security measures.177 But by the 
time of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, these supposedly more conservative 
courts were nonetheless willing to block key executive and legislative measures 
for dealing with suspected terrorists.178 
In all these areas, norms that were previously underenforced as part of the 
New Deal settlement became rigorously enforced over time. The obvious 
question, of course, is whether there is reason to believe that the same thing 
might happen with respect to federalism or economic liberty. I make no 
confident predictions here. My fundamental point is simply that the current 
doctrines that make the ACA’s defenders so confident of their positions are 
themselves historically contingent and not set in stone. The only thing we can 
say with relative certainty is that as popular opinion shifts concerning the 
appropriate role of government and the legitimacy of programs like the ACA, 
those shifts will have an impact—at some point, in some form—on 
constitutional doctrine. 
A. Institutional Mechanisms 
Almost no one seems to believe anymore that political culture, and social 
movements do not influence the courts or the development of constitutional 
law. The tricky part is identifying the institutional mechanisms by which this 
occurs. This essay is not the place to develop a full-blown institutional theory of 
popular constitutionalism, and my central claim can remain agnostic on that 
issue. That claim asserts simply that the constitutional issues raised in the ACA 
suits are “easy” only within current doctrine, that that doctrine underenforces 
the relevant constitutional norms, and that such underenforcement is 
historically contingent and vulnerable to shifts in the zeitgeist. It may be 
helpful, however, to offer a few observations on the institutional mechanisms by 
which popular constitutionalism may influence doctrinal change. 
Jack Balkin has helpfully identified two institutional paths by which popular 
 
 173. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 18 
at 300 (narrating the transformation of the Court’s role). 
 174. Cf., e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).  
 175. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
 176. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 177. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 75–103 (2000) 
(describing the Warren Court’s national security cases). 
 178. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); see 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 18, at 341 (discussing the Court’s assertiveness in the terrorism cases). 
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constitutionalism influence the development of constitutional law. One path 
runs through political parties: “social movements . . . influence the two major 
political parties, which, in turn control the system of judicial appointments.”179 
The point is not that judges self-consciously accede to the wishes of parties or 
movements in interpreting the Constitution; rather, social activism “leads to the 
appointment of judges who sincerely believe that the best interpretation of the 
Constitution is one that happens to be sympathetic with social movement 
claims.”180 Professor Balkin and Sanford Levinson have labeled this mechanism 
“partisan entrenchment,” reflecting the fact that the judges appointed by 
political partisans may well outlast the political force of the social movement 
that brought them to the bench.181 
Professor Balkin’s second path involves “appeals to the values of national 
elites.”182 “Social movement politics,” he argues, “play a crucial role in getting 
both popular and elite opinion to view the world differently and to 
acknowledge changes as salient and important.”183 Again, judges are unlikely to 
see themselves as bending the Constitution to suit contemporary mores; rather, 
political change influences how judges see the world, and constitutional 
doctrine may look different in light of such changed circumstances. The key 
distinction between these two paths is that “[a]ppeals to national elite values try 
to change constitutional doctrine by changing the minds of sitting judges,” 
which tend to reflect elite opinion, “while the strategy of partisan entrenchment 
tries to change the judges.”184 
The next two sections examine how both these mechanisms may influence 
the way that courts formulate and apply constitutional doctrine in the ACA 
litigation. Section B considers the operation of public opinion and social 
movements through the political branches. I focus on the “Tea Party,” which 
actually originated in opposition to the Wall Street bailouts but quickly came to 
focus on healthcare reform as a core mobilizing issue,185 but I also consider 
popular constitutionalist claims by the ACA’s proponents. Although Professor 
Balkin emphasizes the political branches’ role in appointing judges, who in turn 
shape doctrine, I consider some additional ways in which political branch 
actions may influence judicial decisionmaking. Section C turns to the “the 
people themselves”186 and the broader influence of public opinion on judges 
 
 179. Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) the Constitution: The Case 
of the New Departure, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27, 30 (2005). 
 180. Id. at 32. 
 181. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. 
REV. 1045, 1067 (2001). 
 182. Balkin, supra note 179, at 32. 
 183. Id. at 34. 
 184. Id. at 32–33. 
 185. See generally FOLEY, supra note 47, at 1–19 (describing the Tea Party’s origins and general 
principles); Ilya Somin, The Tea Party Movement and Popular Constitutionalism, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 
300 (2011) (situating the Tea Party within broader theoretical discussions of popular constitutionalism 
and social movements). 
 186. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
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interpreting the Constitution. Survey data shows profound shifts in public views 
on government since the New Deal; in particular, a public that placed most of 
its faith in national institutions after the Depression now reposes considerably 
more trust in state and local governments. Likewise, large majorities of the 
American people believe the ACA to be unconstitutional. While such views will 
not control the outcome of Supreme Court litigation in any crude way, the 
Court is unlikely to be indifferent to them. 
Finally, Section D considers an additional institutional mechanism that most 
theories of popular constitutionalism discount—that is, the role of state 
governments. Twenty-eight states have signed onto various suits challenging the 
ACA.187 Nor is state action confined to litigation: state legislatures have enacted 
laws purporting to constrain ACA implementation, and state executive officials 
have pushed back against particular aspects of the ACA through administrative 
channels.188 I want to suggest that state governmental action may be a 
particularly promising mode of popular constitutionalism because it 
incorporates elite as well as mass opinion and features well-developed 
mechanisms of accountability. These advantages are all on display in broad 
controversies over the ACA. 
B. Social Movements and Political Branch Action 
Much of the scholarship on popular constitutionalism has focused on the 
role of social movements in shaping constitutional meaning. In Professor 
Balkin’s account, social movements influence existing political parties, who win 
elections and ultimately appoint judges that interpret the Constitution in ways 
congenial to the movement’s agenda.189 The Supreme Court Justices that will 
ultimately decide the ACA cases represent the judicial legacy of successive 
waves of partisan activity, motivated by contrasting impulses to recover 
something of a constitutional vision giving greater weight to federalism and 
economic liberties, on the Republican side,190 and to legitimate a more 
progressive vision of activist government, on the Democratic side. It is harder to 
assess the impact of current social movements on constitutional doctrine. 
Defenders of the ACA have suggested that the new healthcare law itself “was 
the product of popular constitutionalism, a victory for political advocates who 
argued that the right to health care was a fundamental human right that 
 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004). 
 187. For an overview of state litigation challenging the ACA, see Richard Cauchi, State Legislation 
and Actions Challenging Certain Health Reforms, 2011-2012, NCSL, (Feb. 20, 2012), 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/state-laws-and-actions-challenging-aca.aspx#AG. 
 188. See infra notes 244–245 and accompanying text. 
 189. See supra note 179. 
 190. See, e.g., Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on Constitutional Power, 
78 IND. L.J. 363, 367 (2003) (“Since 1995, the Rehnquist Court has begun adopting theories of 
congressional power and federalism strikingly similar to those developed in the reports of the Reagan 
Justice Department. One of those reports was devoted to the critical role of judicial appointments in 
shaping the development of the law.”). 
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warranted protection by the federal government.”191 The ACA’s opponents—
particularly the Tea Party—also claim the popular constitutionalist mantel.192 
These sorts of conflicting claims highlight both the vibrancy of the “constitution 
outside the courts” in contemporary culture and the danger that “popular 
constitutionalism” can mean just about anything. 
According to one leading account, “there’s no Tea Party, but there is a Tea 
Party movement.”193 That movement seems to have originated in the spring of 
2009 in a series of protests growing out of the national government’s handling of 
the economic crisis, but it quickly took up the ACA as a focal point for its 
critique of big government.194 The group has “no central leader, organization, or 
even organizing committee,” but rather relies on “small chapters scattered 
throughout the country, with rough coordination via social media, the Internet, 
and local activist groups.”195 Ilya Somin has pointed out that, although there are 
many commonalities between the Tea Party and other movements that have 
changed our constitutional landscape, “the Tea Party . . . is the first such 
movement in many years to focus its efforts primarily on limiting the power of 
the federal government.”196 
As Professor Somin notes, “[i]t is too early to say whether the Tea Party will 
have any major lasting impact.”197 There is little doubt, however, that the 
movement has sparked a rare emphasis on constitutional law—and even 
constitutional theory—in public debate.198 Professor Balkin’s model emphasizes 
the interaction of social movements and political parties, and in fact the Tea 
Party has pursued a deliberate strategy of “opportunistically inflitrat[ing] 
existing political parties (mostly the Republican Party), pressuring them to 
embrace principles of importance to the movement.”199 The movement has had 
considerable success at the congressional level, supporting numerous successful 
candidates in the 2010 elections and establishing a Tea Party caucus in 
Congress.200 With all due respect to the crazy unpredictability of this year’s race 
 
 191. Rebecca E. Zietlow, Democratic Constitutionalism and the Affordable Care Act, 72 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1367, 1367 (2011). 
 192. It is not just the Tea Party—whatever we make of them—that is increasingly discontented with 
federal authority. Once we move beyond the particular issue of healthcare, much of the discontent 
comes from the political Left as well as the Right. At various times in the past decade, progressive 
proponents of environmental protection and gay rights, as well as opponents of the War on Terror, 
have all pressed reform at the state level during periods when federal policy was contrary to their goals. 
See generally Young, Dark Side, supra note 84. 
 193. FOLEY, supra note 47 , at xiii. 
 194. See id.; Rebecca M. Zietlow, Popular Originalism? The Tea Party Movement and Constitutional 
Theory 5–6 (U. Toledo Legal Stud., Research Paper No. 2011-09, 2011). 
 195. FOLEY, supra note 47, at xiii. 
 196. Somin, supra note 185, at 309. 
 197. Id. at 304. 
 198. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Tea-ing Up the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2010, at WK1.  
 199. FOLEY, supra note 47, at viii; see also Barnett, Tea Party, supra note 20 (“The Tea Party . . . has 
resisted any interest in forming a third party, seeking instead to take over the Republican Party by 
organizing at the local level and backing challengers to incumbents in primaries.”). 
 200. Richard Albert, The Constitutional Politics of the Tea Party Movement, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 
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for the Republican nomination, however, it seems unlikely that the Tea Party 
will ultimately succeed in nominating one of their preferred candidates for 
President. If a moderate Republican wins the White House in 2012, the Tea 
Party will likely have an impact on legislative initiatives in Congress and, 
perhaps, judicial selection. And even if President Obama wins reelection, his 
legislative initiatives and judicial nominees will confront a congressional 
opposition profoundly influenced by Tea Party principles. 
Professor Balkin’s partisan entrenchment model hardly captures all the 
ways in which political change influences constitutional law, however. Another 
involves the enactment of ordinary legislation in response to social movements. 
I have argued elsewhere that ordinary legislation often has constitutional 
significance, in the sense that statutes, regulations, and government practices 
“constitute” our governmental structure in ways that supplement the bare-
bones edifice of the canonical Constitution.201 The ACA is certainly 
“constitutional” in this sense—it restructures the relationship between federal 
and state regulators, as well as the rights and obligations of individual citizens, 
in profound ways. My point in this essay is slightly different, however: Ordinary 
enactments, particularly to the extent that they create lasting institutions like 
government agencies and endow important interest groups with new or 
enhanced interests that they will fight to protect, acquire significant institutional 
weight that judges ultimately must take into account in constitutional 
interpretation. As Ronald Dworkin’s classic discussion recognized, 
constitutional theories and doctrines developed by judges must “fit” the greater 
part of our existing institutional arrangements.202 By changing those 
arrangements—that is, the vast majority of our law that is not constitutionally 
entrenched—political movements also shape the constraints within which 
constitutional interpreters must operate. 
Similarly, political movements elect or at least influence Presidents. In 
Professor Balkin’s account, the primary role of the Executive is to appoint 
judges. But Presidents shape constitutional law in other ways as well. They 
interpret the Constitution for themselves in innumerable ways: They may veto 
laws on constitutional grounds even though the courts would uphold them, as 
Andrew Jackson did with the Bank;203 they may be the primary constitutional 
interpreter in areas, such as foreign and military policy, where the courts are 
unlikely to intrude;204 they may tailor the interpretation and implementation of 
federal statutes by executive agencies to constitutional concerns whether or not 
those concerns are shared by the courts.205 Likewise, the President influences 
the courts in ways other than appointments: As a litigant, the Executive often 
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can affect the timing and posture of judicial interpretation by seeking or 
opposing certiorari;206 its views both of constitutional meaning and of the 
governmental interests that figure in most doctrinal tests carry significant 
weight with the courts;207 and in extreme cases the Executive may undermine 
legislation it views as unconstitutional by refusing to defend it when it is 
challenged.208 
It is not hard to imagine how these dynamics might bear on the future 
development of constitutional doctrine relevant to healthcare. The enactment 
of the ACA, the concomitant creation and expansion of federal and state 
bureaucracies to implement it, and the establishment of key individual 
entitlements such as the right to coverage without regard to preexisting 
conditions all create established institutions and settled expectations that will 
exercise increasing gravitational force on constitutional interpretation as the 
years go on. The weight of these institutions will vary as future Congresses and 
state governments either implement the ACA’s mandates or chip away at it 
through underfunding, partial repeals, or bureaucratic resistance. Likewise, the 
coming presidential election will likely function as a sort of referendum on the 
ACA. In the event that the legislation’s constitutionality is not conclusively 
resolved prior to the election,209 the outcome of the election will either cement 
or undermine the ACA’s standing. And the posture of the next presidential 
administration—that is, a hostile Romney administration or a friendly second 
Obama administration—may matter a great deal. If a Romney administration 
were to refuse to defend the Act on federalism grounds, for instance, that would 
likely have an important impact on the ACA’s prospects in the courts. 
To say that social movements in favor of healthcare rights and against an 
overactive national government will “have an important impact” on 
constitutional adjudication, however, leaves us still a long way from pinning 
down precisely what that impact will be or how it will weigh against other 
factors. None of the extant theories of popular constitutionalism can provide 
anything close to a definitive answer to those questions. And that problem 
becomes even more daunting as we move from concrete institutional 
mechanisms, such as the influence of social movements on political parties and 
the national political branches, to the more diffuse influence of public opinion 
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at large. 
C. Public Opinion and the Court 
Social movements and other forms of popular constitutionalism influence 
broader public opinion—both that of legal elites and the public at large.210 Over 
time, as Barry Friedman has shown, shifts in those opinions seem to influence 
the course of constitutional interpretation.211 This section surveys changes in 
public opinion and speculates a bit as to how those changes may affect the 
constitutional environment in which the ACA cases will be decided. At least 
three sets of views are potentially relevant: public attitudes about the general 
distribution of authority between the national government and the states; 
attitudes about the Supreme Court and the role of judicial review; and specific 
public views about the constitutionality and desirability of the ACA itself. This 
paper makes no strong predictions about how the Court will respond to these 
shifts in public opinion. The point is simply to cast suggest that contemporary 
opinion may offer the Court an opening to change its doctrine if it is inclined to 
do so. 
Survey data on popular trust in government reflects significant alterations in 
relative trust for states and national institutions since the New Deal. Megan 
Mullin reports that “[a]lthough trust in the federal government has declined 
since the 1960s, attitudes toward subnational governments have held steady or 
even improved. State and local governments historically inspired little public 
confidence, but surveys conducted in recent decades reveal rising public support 
relative to feelings toward Washington.”212 The result is that “[g]iven a choice 
among levels of government, survey respondents are increasingly likely to 
express faith and confidence in states and localities and to perceive them as 
being closer to the people and giving more for the public’s money.”213 
Summarizing the available data, Cindy Kam and Robert Mikos conclude that 
[c]itizens on average evaluate the performance of the federal government as 
significantly lower than that of the state and local governments, report less faith in the 
federal government to “do the right thing,” have significantly lower confidence in the 
ability of the federal government to solve problems effectively, see the federal 
government as significantly less responsive than lower levels of government, and 
nearly 60 percent see the federal government as the most corrupt level of 
government.
214
 
As Professors Kam and Mikos point out, “[t]rust in government is politically 
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consequential: it affects public opinion and voting decisions.”215 Most obviously, 
support for state institutions may translate into political opposition to measures 
that would increase federal power vis-à-vis the states. In Federalist 17, 
Alexander Hamilton suggested that state governments “will generally possess 
the confidence and good will of the people; and with so important a support will 
be able effectually to oppose all incroachments of the national government.”216 
Robert Mikos has dubbed this phenomenon the “populist safeguards of 
federalism.”217 While it is difficult to establish the influence of such safeguards 
directly, some scholars have suggested that they were powerful enough to impel 
movements in the 1980s and 1990s to devolve significant governmental 
authority to the states.218 
The impact of such shifts in public opinion may not be confined to the 
political branches of government. Barry Friedman’s account of the Rehnquist 
Court’s “federalist revival” in the mid-1990s, for example, suggests that “[e]ven 
if some of the specific federalism decisions were hard to follow and others 
barely registered, the American public was by all accounts well behind the idea 
of devolving power to the states.”219 When the Court decided United States v. 
Lopez in 1995, for example, “[p]olls . . . not only showed huge support for states 
running things like education, crime fighting, and job training but also showed 
the public’s ability to distinguish functions that were better suited to the federal 
government, such as the environment, civil rights, and the economy.”220 The 
Court may thus feel more confident limiting Congress’s power when public 
opinion seems to want that power to be more limited. 
We have also seen, and continue to see, important shifts in public 
perceptions of the Court’s role, and these shifts have arguably supported the 
Court’s gradual expansion of its authority in the years since its New Deal 
retreat. As previously described, the Court did not stay in retreat for long; 
rather, it shifted its ground to noneconomic liberties. Although many of its 
decisions in the 1950s and 1960s were controversial at the time, over the long 
term the Court seems to have established itself in a popular role as the primary 
guarantor of civil liberties.221 And as such, it has been confident enough to move 
from underenforcement of those norms to rigorous enforcement today. 
Moreover, the Court seems to have succeeded not only in finding a new role 
of enforcing noneconomic liberties, but also in translating that success into 
expansion into other areas. Recent empirical work has concluded that the 
liberal support that the Court generated with its decisions in favor of civil rights 
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is at least somewhat “portable”—that is, the Court has managed to hold that 
support even as it has become more conservative and shifted its attention away 
from civil rights enforcement.222 Even the Court’s award of the presidency to the 
Republican candidate in 2000 seems to have had merely transitory effects not 
only on public support for the Court generally, but even on support among 
liberals.223 In any event, the Court has been sufficiently confident to expand 
relatively aggressive constitutional review into many areas of separation of 
powers,224 even at the risk of direct conflict with the national political branches. 
To the extent that underenforcement of constitutional principle reflects the 
Court’s lack of confidence vis-à-vis the political branches, these trends suggest 
that the post-1937 “double standard” may not last forever. That standard 
reflected an effort by the Court to develop new areas of judicial review while 
respecting the national political branches’ primacy with respect to the old 
preoccupations of federalism and economic liberty. But as the Court has 
recovered its standing, that double standard has begun to erode. Most 
obviously, the Rehnquist Court’s “federalist revival” began—albeit extremely 
cautiously—a reentry into the field of federalism-based restraints on national 
authority. And, as I have noted, the Court has even made some forays back into 
the sensitive territory of economic rights.225 More recent cases undermine the 
very existence of a double standard between economic and “personal” rights—
in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., for example, the Roberts Court aggressively 
applied free speech principles (typically seen as “personal”) to invalidate state 
healthcare legislation,226 and that decision has already spurred similar speech-
based challenges to federal regulation of the prescription drug industry.227 
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The post-New Deal settlement prescribing broad judicial deference to the 
political branches on matters of federalism and economic rights is a product of a 
wounded Supreme Court, humbled by its confrontation with the political 
branches during the Depression. The Court initially recovered its confidence by 
expanding judicial review in areas that did not implicate the old sore points. But 
now the Court has established itself as the critical champion of liberty in cases 
like Brown, Brandenburg, and Mapp, and it has successfully extended that role 
into policing the national separation of powers228 and the democratic process 
itself.229 Why should we assume that a Court with a reconstructed sense of 
legitimacy, staffed by justices with no direct memory of the New Deal crisis, 
would continue to view principles of federalism and economic liberty as 
requiring unusual degrees of doctrinal caution? It seems likely that the Court’s 
expanded confidence will ultimately tell across the board. 
We have few reliable tools, unfortunately, for gauging prospectively how 
changing public attitudes are likely to affect the Court’s exercise of judicial 
review. It is particularly hard to know what it would take to prompt the Court 
to reconsider its general deference toward the political branches on basic 
questions like the scope of the Commerce Clause. One can imagine, however, 
more limited shifts in particular areas. For example, consider a hypothetical 
scenario involving the Court’s state sovereign immunity jurisprudence. Previous 
periods of judicial activism in this area have always coincided with serious state 
debt crises. The Eleventh Amendment itself was ratified in response to 
Chisholm v. Georgia, which decided that the States could be held accountable 
in federal court for their Revolutionary War debts.230 Likewise, the expansion of 
state sovereign immunity to cover federal question cases, as part of a new wave 
of Eleventh Amendment decisions, responded to another massive debt crisis 
involving the States’ Reconstruction-era bonds.231 Arguably, the Rehnquist 
Court’s aggressive foray into state sovereign immunity law in the 1990s232 came 
15 years too early, before there was a policy need to support the Court’s 
aggressive protection of the states’ public fiscs. Congress responded by pushing 
back hard, repeatedly seeking to rewrite federal statutes to get around state 
sovereign immunity.233 And the Court backed down, at least to some extent, 
moderating its jurisprudence on abrogation of state sovereign immunity 
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substantially in the Rehnquist Court’s last years.234 
With the States now financially on the ropes, however, the need to protect 
them from private damages liability makes somewhat more sense. Moreover, 
the public may well perceive the States as more financially responsible than the 
national government in light of recent brinksmanship over the federal debt 
ceiling. To the extent that people react in this way, the public might support 
greater financial protections for states if the Court should seek to further 
extend its sovereign immunity caselaw.235 Or they might not, of course. It is 
much easier to say that the Court is not indifferent to shifts in public opinion 
than it is to say what the Court will do in response. 
The public has views not only on general matters of federalism and judicial 
review, but also on particular constitutional issues—like the constitutionality of 
the ACA itself. A recent USA Today/Gallup poll found that “Americans 
overwhelmingly believe the ‘individual mandate’ . . . is unconstitutional, by a 
margin of 72% to 20%. Even a majority of Democrats, and a majority of those 
who think the healthcare law is a good thing, believe that provision is 
unconstitutional.”236 Similarly, a poll conducted last year by the Associated 
Press and the National Constitution Center asked respondents whether “the 
Federal Government should have the power to require all Americans to buy 
health insurance, and to pay a fine if they don’t.” Only 16 percent of 
respondents said that the Federal Government should have that power, and 82 
percent said that it should not.237 
These are pretty striking numbers, but the ACA’s defenders tend to dismiss 
such attitudes as some kind of false consciousness. Andrew Koppelman, for 
instance, asserts that “[t]he unconstitutionality of health care reform is another 
of those [urban] legends [propagated by the Republican Party], legitimated in 
American culture by frequent repetition.”238 Contemporary scholarship on 
popular constitutionalism, however, has taught us that constitutional scholars 
indulge in this sort of condescension toward our fellow citizens at our peril. In 
any given case, the Court may surprise or even defy the popular will, and that 
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may well happen with the ACA cases. But over time, “Supreme Court decisions 
tend to converge with the considered judgment of the American people.”239 
Certainly it is not obvious that the Court needs to continue to defer to broad 
assertions of national power when broad majorities of the American people 
distrust national institutions and already believe the ACA to be 
unconstitutional. 
D. The States 
One important and frequently overlooked aspect of the healthcare debate as 
an episode of popular constitutionalism is the role of state governments. State 
opposition to the ACA has taken a number of forms. Most obviously, states are 
the primary parties challenging the ACA’s constitutionality in court. Wholly 
apart from their prospects of success on the merits, these suits serve as a vehicle 
for articulating an alternative view of constitutional meaning from that 
embodied in the ACA. In this sense, the States’ role in the ACA litigation 
parallels Virginia’s and Kentucky’s challenge to the Alien and Sedition Acts in 
the early Republic, which articulated a more libertarian conception of free 
speech and a more limited view of national authority.240 More recent parallels 
would include the many state and local resolutions condemning aspects of the 
USA PATRIOT Act as unduly infringing civil liberties,241 as well as state efforts 
to enforce or exempt themselves from federal immigration policies by either 
enforcing federal law more vigorously than the federal executive has been 
willing to do, opting out of federal immigration programs like the “Secure 
Cities” initiative that the states consider unfair, or providing sanctuaries for 
certain types of aliens in circumstances where federal law makes no exception.242 
States have also pursued a variety of bureaucratic strategies that we might 
group under the label of “uncooperative federalism.”243 At least twenty states, 
for example, have declined to participate in the portion of the ACA that enlists 
them to create a high-risk insurance pool, thereby requiring federal authorities 
undertake that task.244 To the extent that the success of the federal healthcare 
regime depends on state cooperation and implementation, this sort of 
“pushback” is likely to be a highly effective means for reshaping federal policy, 
especially at the level of institutional detail. And while much of the state 
bureaucratic resistance is likely to focus on pragmatic objections to particular 
aspects of the national program, such resistance can also be a vehicle for 
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limiting national control on federalism grounds or enlarging the scope of 
individual liberty allowed under the Act. 
States may be a particularly salutary institutional vehicle for popular 
constitutionalism, especially in comparison with social movements, 
nongovernmental organizations, and political parties. Social movements are 
typically dominated by organizations and individuals that may or may not have 
robust internal mechanisms of accountability. Even political parties have 
traditionally figured in our law as private associations; possess constitutional 
rights but are not easily regulated to ensure accountability to their members.245 
States, by contrast, are themselves democratic governments subject both to 
popular accountability and constitutional norms. The recent re-election 
campaign of Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott, for example, featured a 
public debate concerning whether Texas’s participation in various lawsuits 
resisting national encroachments—including the ACA litigation—actually 
reflected Texans’ views and was a good use of the State’s resources.246 If states 
do have important advantages as vehicles for constitutional contestation, then 
efforts to construe standing doctrine broadly to exclude state parties from 
litigation like the ACA challenges247 are dangerously misguided. 
States also facilitate popular constitutionalism in a broader sense. When 
constitutional or political constraints preclude homogenizing legislation at the 
national level, national inaction leaves the individual states as sites for political 
and constitutional contestation. We still see, for example, considerable diversity 
on healthcare policy among the states notwithstanding the ACA. Ohio has just 
voted to repudiate the individual mandate,248 while Vermont has resolved to 
move beyond the ACA to a single-payer state healthcare system.249 Fledgling 
social movements may find it easier to influence one or two states than the 
national government, and the opportunity to test out their vision in one or two 
jurisdictions may in turn enhance the persuasiveness of their message.250 In this 
important sense, federalism enhances the opportunities for, and diversity of, a 
national conversation regarding constitutional meaning. 
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V 
CONCLUSION 
Justice Ginsburg has observed that judges “do not alone shape legal 
doctrine but . . . they participate in a dialogue with other organs of government, 
and with the people as well.”251 Although legal theory has become intensely 
interested in the phenomenon of popular constitutionalism over the past decade 
or two, we are a long way from any sort of rigorous understanding of how social 
movements like the Tea Party, public opinion at large, and judicial 
decisionmaking interact. We simply know that these interactions matter. What I 
have tried to do in this essay is to link popular constitutionalism to the 
phenomenon of underenforcement of constitutional norms through judicial 
doctrine. My basic point is a simple one: Underenforcement reflects the Court’s 
views of its own institutional capacity to define and enforce constitutional 
principles vis-à-vis other branches of the government and the People at large. 
As such, underenforcement is historically contingent; even though 
constitutional principle endures, different principles may be over- and 
underenforced at different times, depending on historical circumstances. And as 
political circumstances and attitudes change, constitutional doctrine is likely to 
change with them. 
We should keep the historically contingent nature of underenforcement in 
mind as we think about the Affordable Care Act. The constitutional debate 
over the individual mandate has—regrettably—gotten a little chippy. In a 
popular online essay, Andrew Koppelman has pronounced that “[t]he 
constitutional objections [to the ACA] are silly,” and that any adverse ruling on 
the ACA by the Court could only be an illegitimately political effort by “the 
conservative majority on the Court . . . to crush the most important progressive 
legislation in decades.”252 Similarly, Peter Smith has asserted that “[s]muggling a 
libertarian-based limitation into constitutional law by concealing it in the garb 
of federalism . . . can only deepen the suspicions of those who already view 
arguments about federalism as simply a guise for some other policy agenda.”253 
Professor Smith then proceeds to recycle the old canard purporting to link 
contemporary advocates of federalism to Southern segregationist policies of the 
last century.254 The implication seems to be that the constitutionality of the 
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ACA is so clear that only stupid people—or bad ones—could disagree. 
But the ACA’s critics are not stupid, much less segregationist. Neither are 
the American people, three-quarters of whom believe the ACA to be 
unconstitutional.255 Confident predictions about the outcome of the ACA 
litigation rest on judicial doctrine, not the uncontested meaning of the 
Constitution itself. The Supreme Court’s current doctrine underenforces 
constitutional norms of federalism and economic liberty, and if that doctrine 
remains intact, then it is hard to see how the ACA will not ultimately survive 
the current challenges to its constitutionality. I have tried to show, however, 
that underenforcement is a historically contingent phenomenon, and doctrine 
that has shifted once can shift again. If the Court does shift ground, it will likely 
be in response to various aspects of popular constitutionalism—that is, public 
attitudes on federalism, economic liberty, and the role of the Court itself. In 
each of these areas, there is reason to believe that public opinion has moved 
away from key aspects of the New Deal settlement. 
We would do well to remember that doctrine is historically contingent in a 
way that the Constitution itself is not. And the movement of history is 
unpredictable. The last decade and a half has witnessed a presidential 
impeachment, a presidential election tie broken by the Supreme Court, a 
massive terrorist attack on American soil, the worst financial meltdown since 
the Great Depression, the embrace of gay rights by large majorities of 
Americans, and the election of an African American President. We live in an 
age of catastrophes and miracles, none of which many people saw coming. The 
changing needs and views of the People will have their own impact on future 
doctrinal shifts, and that impact is not easy to predict. To the extent that the 
lawsuits challenging the ACA amount to a vehicle for articulating a different 
view of constitutional meaning, they may well find a more receptive public 
audience than they would have a decade or two ago. And if that happens, one 
should not expect the current underenforced status of federalism, or possibly 
even of economic liberty, to persist forever. 
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